Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections on standard web ports (80, 443) initiated by Windows executable files (.exe) to specific, known malicious or suspicious domains (codeonicinc.com, setupsoftwarecenter.com). This pattern is consistent with malware installers attempting to download secondary payloads or communicate with C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the PhantomSub campaign, which abuse WhatsApp spam channels. It also identifies network connections to known remote C2 channel-list URLs or domains used by these packages to automate channel joining.
This rule detects malicious shell execution patterns associated with ClickFix-based social engineering campaigns, such as the Macfinger AMOS campaign. It monitors for the execution of common shell utilities (curl, wget, bash, sh) with suspicious command-line parameters ('force=1') interacting with known malicious IP addresses (45.150.33.128), as well as the execution of specific malicious files or network callbacks identified in these campaigns.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects when a user or service account accesses or downloads a high volume of files from SharePoint or OneDrive that match sensitive keywords such as 'password', 'secret', 'credential', or specific file extensions like '.pem', '.pfx', and '.env'. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to harvest credentials, API keys, or configuration secrets from cloud storage repositories.
This rule detects outbound HTTP GET requests initiated by a process using a 'WebClient' user-agent to retrieve a file named 'shell.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries downloading second-stage PowerShell payloads to a compromised host.
Detects high-volume file download, access, or preview activity originating from known anonymous proxy services. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration or unauthorized mass data collection from cloud storage applications.
Detects high-volume file download, access, or preview activity originating from known anonymous proxy services. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration or unauthorized mass data collection from cloud storage applications.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects instances where a browser or agentic-browser process initiates a file download and subsequently executes that same file within a five-minute window, without the intervention of a user-driven process like explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of automated 'agentic' browser activity, potentially signifying hijacked web instructions or malicious automated tool execution flows.
Detects usage of the Windows certutil.exe utility with flags commonly used by adversaries to download files from remote URLs or decode base64 encoded files. These techniques are often utilized for ingress tool transfer or deobfuscating malicious payloads.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin command-line utility to perform file downloads or add files to a transfer job. Adversaries may abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for downloading malicious files while evading detection or maintaining persistence.
This rule monitors for suspicious activities involving digital certificates. It detects PowerShell processes attempting to import a certificate into the Root store, which could indicate persistence or credential interception, and it detects the use of curl to download files named 'cert.pem' with insecure SSL settings (no certificate verification).
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe to install an MSI package from a remote URL. This pattern involves the Windows Installer utility being invoked by explorer.exe with the /i (install) and /passive (unattended installation) flags, indicating a potentially malicious download and execution chain often used to deliver payloads via social engineering.
Detects instances where common script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, etc.) are launched by developer-centric processes (node.exe, npm.exe, Code.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments often used for reconnaissance, payload downloading, or obfuscated command execution.
Detects behavior associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor, where a user account downloads a file from OneDrive, modifies or replaces that file, and re-uploads it within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This pattern is consistent with the 'taint shared content' technique used to distribute malicious files through legitimate cloud storage.
Detects VBScript files that exhibit characteristics of a downloader or dropper, including common Windows API usage (WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream), staging in the C:\Users\Public\ directory, and performing sandbox evasion via WMI InstallDate checks.
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