Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,581 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
729
235
193
112
98
Contributors
323
311
275
169
73
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
1,581
Platforms
1,042
289
181
159
111
Products / Services
497
264
238
141
128
MITRE Techniques
852
757
502
416
312
CVEs
5
3
3
3
2
IDS Classtypes
211
4
3
3
2
IDS Protocols
219
7
3
1
1
This rule detects unauthorized downloads of Tailscale VPN client binaries or related dependencies (such as wintun.dll) originating from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui'). Such activity is often associated with the Kothamine threat actor attempting to establish unauthorized remote access or command-and-control channels by provisioning VPN software on compromised hosts.
This rule monitors for high-frequency download or access events of files associated with AI development, such as model weights (.pt, .ckpt, .safetensors, .h5, .onnx, .pkl, .pb), checkpoints, and research datasets from cloud storage. It triggers when an account accesses or downloads 20 or more unique AI-related files within a 60-minute window, which is indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates to a cloud service (Azure AD) from an unrecognized ASN, device, or country without performing MFA, followed shortly by high-risk actions such as mailbox rule creation, mass file downloads, or OAuth application registration. This pattern is indicative of session cookie theft or OAuth token replay used to bypass MFA.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize both 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) and 'Invoke-RestMethod' (irm), often used to download and execute code directly from remote sources. The rule specifically monitors for known indicators like specific IP addresses, file paths, or the concurrent use of these cmdlets in a single command line.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with execution policy bypass flags that simultaneously attempts to use curl.exe and Copy-Item to interact with suspicious remote domains or obfuscated command line arguments, potentially indicating a malicious payload delivery and staging attempt.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform a web request to google.com to download a file named Document.pdf, followed by the immediate execution of that downloaded file using Start-Process.
The following analytic identifies a process command line referencing the IronLanguages GitHub repository, which hosts .NET implementation of popular scripting engines.
Adversaries have downloaded these .NET implementations to avoid getting detected by security controls while executing their payloads.
This activity is uncommon in typical enterprise environments outside of software development contexts.
Adversaries have downloaded these .NET implementations to avoid getting detected by security controls while executing their payloads.
This activity is uncommon in typical enterprise environments outside of software development contexts.
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage loader execution chain initiated during npm postinstall processes. This rule monitors for malicious child process spawning (cmd, powershell, curl, wget) by node or npm, as well as the presence of specific markers like the '.git-checker' string or URLs associated with the PolinRider/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA npm supply chain campaign.
Detects Node.js processes executing suspicious command lines that involve fetching and executing remote JavaScript code. This behavior is indicative of a loader or downloader script commonly used to pull and evaluate malicious payloads at runtime, specifically referencing indicators associated with 'GHAPPIER'.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects high-frequency access to mail items via specific client applications, or high-frequency file downloads/access within SharePoint and OneDrive. These patterns may indicate suspicious data collection or exfiltration attempts by a compromised account.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects the execution of npm commands to install specific, potentially malicious or typo-squatted npm packages. The rule filters for common npm install command line arguments and matches against a predefined list of package names that are often associated with supply chain compromise attempts.
Detects the execution of npm commands to install specific, potentially malicious or typo-squatted npm packages. The rule filters for common npm install command line arguments and matches against a predefined list of package names that are often associated with supply chain compromise attempts.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to download common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) or remote access tools from the internet. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious actors attempting to establish persistent remote access to a compromised system.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external URIs matching a specific pattern (a 10-20 character hexadecimal path followed by ?force=1), which is characteristic of the delivery or staging mechanism used by MacStealer (Macfinger) and Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) malware families.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the delivery of AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) payloads. This rule monitors for specific URL patterns (force=1) used by stager scripts to fetch Mach-O binary payloads from known malicious infrastructure or matching known malicious file hashes.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the delivery of AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) payloads. This rule monitors for specific URL patterns (force=1) used by stager scripts to fetch Mach-O binary payloads from known malicious infrastructure or matching known malicious file hashes.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an endpoint initiates an HTTP GET request to a known staging IP with a specific 'force=1' parameter, followed by the execution of a bash shell process. This behavior is associated with the ClickFix attack chain used to deliver AMOS Stealer payloads on macOS.
Page 20 of 76