Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to download
a file to a suspicious location, such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public directories.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
command-line executions that include the -O or --output options. This activity is
significant because downloading files to these locations can indicate an attempt
to bypass security controls or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this
behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further
compromise of the system.
a file to a suspicious location, such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public directories.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
command-line executions that include the -O or --output options. This activity is
significant because downloading files to these locations can indicate an attempt
to bypass security controls or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this
behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further
compromise of the system.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with known malware and C2 infrastructure, including specific IP:port combinations, malicious domains, URLs for file downloads, and SHA256 hashes of known malware. The rule correlates data across device network events, file events, and process execution events to identify potential infections or communication with malicious infrastructure.
Detects instances where a PowerShell session is initiated from Windows Terminal (wt.exe) and subsequently executes a command to download an archive file (e.g., .zip) using common download cmdlets or methods. This pattern is often indicative of an attacker downloading and staging malicious payloads.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with known malware and C2 infrastructure, including specific IP:port combinations, malicious domains, URLs for file downloads, and SHA256 hashes of known malware. The rule correlates data across device network events, file events, and process execution events to identify potential infections or communication with malicious infrastructure.
Detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell session followed by file transfer operations (PutFile or GetFile). This behavior may indicate an attacker using CloudShell to stage, exfiltrate, or move tools within the cloud environment, potentially bypassing endpoint detection by operating within the cloud service infrastructure.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious flags such as encoded commands (-enc, -ec, -encodedcommand) combined with execution policy bypass flags and common .NET classes or methods used for downloading content from the internet (e.g., Net.WebClient, IEX, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is commonly observed in fileless malware delivery or secondary payload retrieval stages.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
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