Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
684 detections
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Detects the execution of Nova ransomware (formerly RALord) by monitoring for its specific modular command-line interface arguments, which include file encryption commands, ransom note deployment, and specific ransom note filenames. The rule monitors process creation events for strings like 'encrypt-all', 'encrypt-path', 'readme-add', '--workers', and the presence of the 'README_NOVA.me' ransom note or unique file extensions associated with its encryption activity.
Detects potential ransomware activity in AWS by identifying high volumes of S3 object encryption (using SSE-C or KMS) followed by the disabling or scheduled deletion of the associated KMS key material. This behavior aims to render data inaccessible to legitimate users while ensuring recovery is inhibited by destroying the cryptographic keys required for decryption.
Detects anomalous mass file modification or renaming activity often associated with ransomware, combined with the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using native utilities like vssadmin or wmic, and the presence of suspicious ransom note filenames.
Detects a potential mass-encryption event by identifying a single host rapidly renaming or rewriting a large volume of files across multiple SMB network shares within a short timeframe, where the renamed files consistently adopt a single file extension.
Detects the presence of PAYLOAD ransomware ELF binaries specifically configured to target VMware ESXi environments. The detection logic looks for a combination of ELF magic bytes, the 'PAYLOAD' string, references to common virtual machine file extensions (e.g., .vmdk, .vmx), and usage of ESXi-specific administration tools such as esxcli or vim-cmd.
Detects HTML smuggling files identified as 'FlipBook' lures, commonly used in device-code phishing campaigns. These lures utilize client-side JavaScript for AES-GCM decryption, extensive comment-based obfuscation, and specific junk-padding techniques to bypass security controls and trick users into providing credentials.
This rule detects mass file modification, creation, or renaming activity involving files with the '.krsid' extension. The threshold is set to monitor for more than 20 occurrences, which is indicative of potential ransomware encryption activity, while explicitly excluding common system, temporary, and development paths, and filtering out processes explicitly performing shadow copy deletion.
Detects the presence of KRSID ransomware by identifying specific embedded strings associated with its configuration, including ransom notes (README_KRSID.Txt), log files (ransomware-silent.Log), encrypted file extensions (.krsid), and common command-line arguments used for operational control.
Detects a rapid, multi-stage intrusion sequence on a single host involving discovery, lateral movement, and high-volume file modifications. The rule identifies anomalous behavior where diverse reconnaissance and lateral movement commands are executed within a compressed timeframe, characteristic of automated or LLM-driven orchestration of ransomware operations.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
Detects high volumes of file creations, modifications, or renames ending with a specific encrypted file extension (.df_win) occurring across multiple network (SMB) shares from a single host within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of ransomware activity where a compromised host attempts to encrypt files on accessible remote storage.
Detects high volumes of file rename operations within a short timeframe, which is a behavioral indicator often associated with the encryption process of ransomware such as CRPx0.
Detects a large volume of file write, rename, or creation operations within a single minute by a single process, concurrently with the creation of files containing common ransomware keywords (e.g., 'readme', 'decrypt', 'how_to'). This behavior is characteristic of ransomware encryption activities.
Detects the ENCFORGE locker malware, associated with the JADEPUFFER campaign, which specifically targets AI/ML-related files such as model checkpoints, vector databases, and training data for the purpose of malicious encryption or destruction.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behaviors such as mass file modifications, lateral movement (SMB/RDP), or persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks/services) following ScreenConnect client session activity. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ScreenConnect to deploy ransomware or move laterally within the network.
Detects Settra ransomware binaries characterized by naming conventions including '_win64.exe', which create 'RESTORE_FILES.txt' ransom notes and use '.locked' or '.locked_wip' file extensions for encrypted data.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
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