Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects a PowerShell in-memory loader pattern that derives an AES key using Rfc2898DeriveBytes, decrypts an encrypted payload using System.Security.Cryptography.Aes, verifies the content with SHA256, and executes the decrypted code in-memory via [System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock]::Create. This technique is often used to bypass file-based security controls by executing stage-two payloads directly in memory.
Detects a high volume of file rename events initiated by a single process on a device within a short time window (5 minutes). This behavior is often indicative of ransomware activity, where files are renamed as part of the encryption or extortion process.
Detects potential Cl0p ransomware activity by correlating the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies or backup catalogs with a subsequent burst of file creation, modification, or renaming activity on the same device. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparing to encrypt files by inhibiting system recovery, followed by the mass encryption stage, while filtering out known administrative and legitimate software update activity.
Bulk file-write activity by a single process within a 1-minute window, filtered to exclude common high-volume legitimate processes (backup agents, AV scanners, installers, sync clients) and correlated with the appearance of ransom-note-style filenames or unusual/new file extensions in the same window, indicative of ransomware encryption post-RAT access.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for specific PowerShell commands associated with file encryption (AES, CreateEncryptor, TransformFinalBlock) and suspicious file manipulation patterns, such as mass renaming of files with common ransomware extensions or the dropping of known ransom note filenames.
Bulk file-write activity by a single process within a 1-minute window, filtered to exclude common high-volume legitimate processes (backup agents, AV scanners, installers, sync clients) and correlated with the appearance of ransom-note-style filenames or unusual/new file extensions in the same window, indicative of ransomware encryption post-RAT access.
Bulk file-write activity by a single process within a 1-minute window, filtered to exclude common high-volume legitimate processes (backup agents, AV scanners, installers, sync clients) and correlated with the appearance of ransom-note-style filenames or unusual/new file extensions in the same window, indicative of ransomware encryption post-RAT access.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects the execution of the 'encrypter-linux-x86' binary on Linux systems, specifically looking for command-line arguments indicative of file encryption activity (-e or --esxi). This binary name is frequently associated with ransomware targeting virtualized environments.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file rename events (more than 50 in a single dataset aggregation) or file renames resulting in the specific extension '.God8Damn'. Such patterns are highly characteristic of ransomware encrypting local or network files.
Detects macOS Mach-O binaries containing AES-GCM cipher references combined with /tmp staging paths, consistent with CrashStealer encrypting stolen data locally with AES-GCM before staging it in /tmp for exfiltration
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file renaming operations combined with the presence of specific file extensions often associated with encryption and the concurrent creation of ransom note files (e.g., 'README.TXT').
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