Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of a potential file encryption utility that uses command-line flags ('enc'/'dec', '-k'/'-i'/'--keyfile') in conjunction with a 'key.txt' file. This pattern is characteristic of custom encryption tools used by threat actors to encrypt files on a system.
Detects the execution of a potential file encryption utility that uses command-line flags ('enc'/'dec', '-k'/'-i'/'--keyfile') in conjunction with a 'key.txt' file. This pattern is characteristic of custom encryption tools used by threat actors to encrypt files on a system.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects the execution of a potential file encryption utility that uses command-line flags ('enc'/'dec', '-k'/'-i'/'--keyfile') in conjunction with a 'key.txt' file. This pattern is characteristic of custom encryption tools used by threat actors to encrypt files on a system.
This rule detects the presence of the GodDamn ransomware encryptor on a host by identifying the specific binary filename (encrypter-windows-gui-x86.exe), its known SHA256 hash, or the presence of the .God8Damn file extension commonly associated with files encrypted by this malware.
These YARA rules detect encrypted ZIP archive files that contain exactly one file. Specific variations are provided for ZIP files containing a single .vbs or .msc file. This pattern is commonly used in malware distribution via email to bypass static security controls, requiring user interaction to decrypt and execute the payload.
Detects mass file renaming activities involving the '.Liushen' extension, commonly associated with the LIUSHEN ransomware behavior where files are appended with this extension after being encrypted.
Detects high-volume file creation events (more than 50 within 5 minutes) on an endpoint using specific file extensions associated with known ransomware families such as INC Ransom (.inc) and Lynx (.lynx).
This rule monitors for two indicators of potential ransomware activity: first, a surge in file renaming or creation events across multiple directories within a short window, suggesting large-scale encryption; second, the creation of potential ransom note files across multiple directories or devices. It uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint data to identify these patterns as part of an incident response strategy.
Detects high-volume file modification events resulting in files renamed with the .inc extension, which is a characteristic behavior of the INC ransomware strain. The rule monitors for more than 50 such modifications on a single host within a 10-minute window, serving as an indicator of active encryption and potential ransomware impact.
Detects TeamPCP-associated behavior in CI/CD environments, specifically the encryption and staging of sensitive secrets using tools like OpenSSL, tar, and curl. The rule monitors for the execution of at least three distinct tools from a specified list within a short time window that interact with files in a /tmp/tmp. staging directory, indicative of preparation for data exfiltration.
Detects high-frequency file write activity combined with the creation of text files, which is a common behavior exhibited by ransomware during the encryption phase of an attack. The rule monitors for a large volume of file creations across a host and specific patterns indicative of ransom note generation.
Detects the execution of command lines containing suspicious keywords associated with potential data encryption, database table destruction, or configuration tampering. These commands, such as those invoking encryption functions or dropping configuration tables, are indicative of malicious activity often performed by ransomware or wiper malware to hinder system recovery or exfiltrate and destroy data.
This rule monitors Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to detect high-volume file creation activity across multiple unique directories. By filtering out common file types, it identifies potential signs of mass file modification, staging for exfiltration, or malicious encryption characteristic of ransomware or data destructive operations.
Detects rapid file renaming of user-critical documents and media files to an .encrypted extension, indicative of mass file encryption activity typically associated with ransomware.
This rule detects potential ransomware or remote access trojan (RAT) activity by identifying either specific command-line indicators (/encrypt, /decrypt) or a high volume of file modifications (create, modify, or rename) across multiple directories within a short time frame, which is characteristic of mass file encryption operations.
This rule detects multi-stage behavior associated with the BQTLock ransomware, including C2 network communication, execution of loaders (PyInstaller-based) from common writable directories, suspicious child process spawning, unauthorized OpenSSH service usage potentially indicating privilege escalation, and mass file encryption indicated by both specific file extensions and bulk rename heuristics.
Detects high-frequency S3 PutObject requests that utilize Customer-Provided Encryption Keys (SSE-C). A high count of such operations within a short window can be indicative of ransomware activity, where an adversary encrypts data within the victim's cloud storage using their own keys to prevent access by the owner.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying processes that perform a high volume of file write, create, or rename operations across a large number of unique file paths within a short timeframe. It also includes a heuristic check for filenames containing 'inc' or 'lynx', often associated with specific ransomware variants.
Detects the execution of 7-Zip (7z.exe) when launched from a specific directory path ('Traiolx Custom Utils') while operating on specific files named 'drata.dat' or 'data.dat'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging or archiving sensitive data for potential exfiltration.
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