Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
This rule monitors for known malicious indicators, including a specific file hash, a C2 IP address, a remote URL associated with potential malicious activity (anydesk.exe), and a domain associated with C3Pool crypto-mining activity, across device processes, network events, and file operations.
This rule monitors for known malicious indicators, including a specific file hash, a C2 IP address, a remote URL associated with potential malicious activity (anydesk.exe), and a domain associated with C3Pool crypto-mining activity, across device processes, network events, and file operations.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
Detects the execution of MSI installers from user-writable directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp, Public) that masquerade as legitimate software applications like Spotify, Zoom, or Microsoft Teams. This behavior is indicative of 'ClickFix' style social engineering lures, where users are prompted to download and execute malicious installers.
Detects compiled LSASS credential-dumper binaries that clone the target process in a suspended state, patch ntdll/amsi/win32kbase hooking regions, and write an in-memory minidump, even when debug/console strings and process ancestry have been scrubbed to evade static and lineage detections
Detects known components of the Sauron malware, including MSI installers, side-loaded executables (rnpkeys.exe), and malicious DLLs (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) by matching known SHA-256 file hashes. It also includes a YARA rule for detecting PE binaries containing the string 'Sauron'.
Detects the embedded configuration structure within unpacked DLL samples associated with the Sauron loader, specifically targeting a fixed magic constant (0xbaadf00d) followed by a 0x40 flag byte.
Detects the presence of an unpacked Sauron Loader DLL by identifying a specific embedded configuration header (magic value 0xbaadf00d followed by flags 0x40) in conjunction with configuration fields like 'group_id' or 'build_id'. This rule is intended for static analysis of file samples.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
This rule detects potential web shells that employ steganographic techniques by embedding malicious executable script code within image file structures (JPG or PNG). It specifically flags files containing common web shell markers 'ONEPIECE' or 'x_best_911' in combination with embedded script tags (e.g., <script, eval, <%, <?php) within files identified as having image magic bytes.
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