Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of InprocServer32 registry keys within CLSID paths in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. These registry locations are frequently abused by adversaries to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code (COM hijacking) by pointing the server path to a malicious DLL or executable.
Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft CoreCLR Debugger (vsdbg.exe) from a directory outside of standard Visual Studio installation paths. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where a malicious vsdbg.dll is planted alongside the renamed vsdbg.exe, a technique observed in malware loader chains like Rapuncel/BoryptGrab.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects the presence of known Vidar Stealer malware binaries (internal build versions 2.0 through 3.4) by matching their SHA256 file hashes. Vidar is an infostealer malware typically used to exfiltrate sensitive data from victim systems.
Detects the presence of a specific Russian-language error string ("Не удалось сгенерировать HWID") within binary files, which is characteristic of the HWID generation mechanism used by Vidar Stealer malware.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE .NET loader components within files by searching for specific magic bytes, debug strings, hardcoded developer file paths, and agent-related operational strings.
This rule detects the presence of ZigCryptoStealer malware deployed via a NativeAOT-compiled Windows executable. The detection relies on identifying specific hardcoded infrastructure strings, such as a BNB Smart Chain RPC endpoint and a specific contract address used to resolve C2 domains. It also looks for common sideloading hosts associated with the malware's delivery.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Detects Vidar Stealer v2.x-3.x custom VM bytecode interpreter used to deobfuscate strings via a fetch-decode-execute loop with sparse opcode dispatch and single accumulator
Detects the presence of file artifacts associated with the Xray-core proxy tool when used as an implant via DLL sideloading. The rule identifies specific files (radcui.dll, config.json, comsrv.dat, KB85809588.bat) or malicious configuration patterns indicating proxy traffic (VLESS/VMess/outbound/inbound) targeting known C2 endpoints.
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects the 'sharedLoad.min.js' loader script associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package family. This script utilizes X25519 ECDH for key exchange and AES-256 decryption to retrieve and execute a second-stage payload hosted on a Sepolia smart contract.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known FeralWolf threat actor malware, including MQTTDoor, MatrixDoor, RDPSocksProxy, GenieLocker ransomware, fscan, and tools leveraging CVE-2026-31431.
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