Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
565 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
464
49
14
12
11
Contributors
217
119
88
54
41
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
565
Platforms
495
55
21
17
14
Products / Services
468
195
64
23
14
MITRE Techniques
180
93
66
63
60
CVEs
4
4
4
4
3
IDS Classtypes
303
37
23
23
21
IDS Protocols
449
3
This rule detects potential Process Doppelganging attempts by looking for specific Windows API calls related to Transactional NTFS (TxF) within HTTP traffic. Specifically, it looks for the presence of "NtCreateTransaction" and "NtCreateSection" in the file data of HTTP responses, indicating a payload that might be attempting to leverage TxF for process creation manipulation.
This rule detects attempts to abuse the macOS AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges function, which allows an application to execute a command with root privileges. The detection is based on the presence of the string "AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges" in HTTP response data, indicating a potential attempt by malware or an attacker to escalate privileges on a macOS system.
This rule detects potential PE injection payloads over HTTP by looking for the presence of both "NtUnmapViewOfSection" and "VirtualAllocEx" in the file data. These API calls are commonly used in process injection techniques, specifically for unmapping legitimate sections of a process and allocating new memory for malicious code.
This rule detects the delivery of a payload designed to bypass macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) mechanisms via HTTP. Specifically, it looks for the string "kTCCServiceCamera" within HTTP response data, indicating an attempt to manipulate camera access permissions. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation techniques on macOS.
This rule detects the delivery of a tool designed to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing the strings "IsUserAnAdmin" and "ShellExecute" (case-insensitive) within the file data, indicating the presence of code commonly used in UAC bypass techniques.
This rule detects attempts to update system firmware from an unverified source. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) where the URI contains the string "firmware" (case-insensitive) and the file data contains the byte sequence "AA 55". This combination suggests a potential firmware update being delivered over HTTP, which could be malicious if the source is not legitimate.
This rule detects the delivery of an Application Shim Database (.sdb file) over HTTP. Application Shims are used by Windows to ensure compatibility with older applications, but can also be abused by attackers for persistence and privilege escalation (e.g., by shimming malicious DLLs). Detecting the transfer of these files, especially over unencrypted HTTP, can indicate suspicious activity related to T1546.011 (Application Shimming).
This rule detects the download of potential malware source code by inspecting HTTP URI paths and file data. It triggers if the HTTP URI contains keywords like 'rat', 'trojan', 'keylogger', 'ransomware', or 'botnet' (case-insensitive) and the downloaded file data contains the string 'import socket' (case-insensitive). This combination suggests the download of Python-based malware source code.
This rule detects HTTP responses that indicate a potential drive-by download infrastructure redirect. Specifically, it looks for HTTP responses to clients that contain the word "redirect" (case-insensitive) in the URI and also contain the "MZ" magic bytes at the beginning of the file data, suggesting an executable file is being served. This combination implies a server is redirecting to or serving an executable file, which is a common tactic in drive-by download attacks.
This rule detects HTTP responses that originate from search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo) and contain a Windows executable (MZ header) in the file data. This behavior is indicative of SEO poisoning, where malicious actors manipulate search engine results to redirect users to malware downloads.
This rule detects the delivery of a Windows Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file via HTTP that could be used for execution flow hijacking. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing a URI with '.dll', the 'MZ' magic bytes at the beginning of the file data, and a file size greater than 10,000 bytes, indicating a potentially legitimate or malicious DLL being downloaded to a client.
This rule detects potential credential phishing attempts by identifying HTTP responses (flow:to_client,established) that contain common keywords associated with login pages, specifically 'password', 'username', and 'action='. The rule looks for these keywords within the file data of the HTTP response, indicating a web page being served to the client that mimics a login form.
This rule detects the download of a Microsoft Office document that is macro-enabled. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing to the client (download) that contains both "[Content_Types].xml" and "vbaProject" within the file data. These strings are indicative of an Office Open XML (OOXML) file (like .docx, .xlsx, .pptx) that contains VBA macros, which are often used in phishing attacks for initial access.
This rule detects HTTP responses that contain specific keywords indicative of a fake CAPTCHA paste attack page. It looks for the terms "CAPTCHA", "paste", and "Win+R" (case-insensitive) within the HTTP response body. This combination suggests a social engineering attempt where users are tricked into pasting malicious content, often after being instructed to open the 'Run' dialog (Win+R).
This rule detects HTTP responses where the 'Content-Type' header is 'application/json' and the response body contains both 'balance' and '0.00' (case-insensitive). This combination, especially in the context of a 'trojan-activity' classification, suggests a potential Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack manipulating financial or account balance data within a JSON response to show a zero balance.
This rule detects drive-by malicious iframe injection by looking for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) that contain an iframe tag, the 'display:none' style attribute, and a 'src=' attribute. This combination is often used by attackers to embed malicious content invisibly into legitimate websites, leading to drive-by downloads or other client-side attacks.
This rule detects potential malicious script injection from ad networks. It looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) that contain common ad-related terms in the HTTP referer header (ad., ads., advert., banner.) and also contain JavaScript code obfuscation techniques like 'eval(' and 'fromCharCode' within the file data. This combination suggests an ad network might be serving malicious JavaScript to clients.
This rule detects HTTP response content injection via a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. It specifically looks for HTML content (indicated by 'Content-Type: text/html') in the HTTP response that contains a '<script' tag and a 'src' attribute pointing to an IP address (e.g., 'src="https?://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'). This pattern suggests that an attacker might be injecting malicious scripts into legitimate web traffic.
This rule detects the creation of in-memory archives using the .NET Compression Library by inspecting HTTP client-bound data for the presence of both "System.IO.Compression" and "ZipArchive" strings. This combination suggests that a .NET application is creating a ZIP archive in memory, which could be indicative of data staging or exfiltration activities.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts where data is archived using scripting libraries. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) containing the strings "zipfile", "ZipFile(", and "write(" in the file data, indicating the use of a scripting library to create and write to a zip archive. This combination suggests that a client is receiving or downloading an archived file that was likely created programmatically for exfiltration.
This rule detects network traffic (HTTP response) from a server to a client that contains both 'GetUserDefaultLCID' and 'ExitProcess' in the file data, case-insensitively. This combination of strings is indicative of malware attempting to evade sandboxes or target specific locales by checking the system's default locale identifier and then potentially exiting if the environment is not suitable. This behavior is often associated with trojan activity.
Page 18 of 27