Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
565 detections
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This rule detects potential automated reconnaissance activity characteristic of the 'Strix' tool against web applications. It uses two detection mechanisms: tracking high-frequency requests that match typical scanning path patterns (excluding OPTIONS requests) and monitoring for a surge in 404 or 400 error responses, which often indicates an automated vulnerability scanner attempting to probe non-existent resources.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern against publicly exposed AI service endpoints. The detection correlates: (1) Enumeration of sensitive AI/MCP-related API endpoints (minimum 3 distinct hits) in a 10-minute window; (2) Subsequent POST requests to AI service endpoints within 15 minutes of the enumeration; and (3) A spike of 5 or more server errors (HTTP 5xx) within 10 minutes following the POST activity. This pattern suggests automated reconnaissance followed by attempted exploitation of exposed AI model interfaces or orchestration services. Covers T1595.002, T1190
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern against publicly exposed AI service endpoints. The detection correlates: (1) Enumeration of sensitive AI/MCP-related API endpoints (minimum 3 distinct hits) in a 10-minute window; (2) Subsequent POST requests to AI service endpoints within 15 minutes of the enumeration; and (3) A spike of 5 or more server errors (HTTP 5xx) within 10 minutes following the POST activity. This pattern suggests automated reconnaissance followed by attempted exploitation of exposed AI model interfaces or orchestration services. Covers T1595.002, T1190
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern against publicly exposed AI service endpoints. The detection correlates: (1) Enumeration of sensitive AI/MCP-related API endpoints (minimum 3 distinct hits) in a 10-minute window; (2) Subsequent POST requests to AI service endpoints within 15 minutes of the enumeration; and (3) A spike of 5 or more server errors (HTTP 5xx) within 10 minutes following the POST activity. This pattern suggests automated reconnaissance followed by attempted exploitation of exposed AI model interfaces or orchestration services. Covers T1595.002, T1190
This rule monitors for network traffic related to known fake GitHub pages and malicious loader sites impersonating LastPass Authenticator. It detects attempts to access specific malicious domains and organization pages on GitHub, as well as the delivery of malicious pages containing spoofed trust badges and branding, commonly used in phishing campaigns.
Detects network activity associated with the SloppyRAT malware, specifically tracking the polling mechanism for reverse SOCKS proxy tasks and subsequent acknowledgment of these tasks via HTTP requests.
Detects communication between a host and a suspected malicious domain (noah-ssh.com.cn) characterized by a specific API request containing a millisecond timestamp and a subsequent HTTP response containing a 'download_link' field. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relay mechanism, likely used for staging and downloading additional malicious payloads.
Detects network traffic where the SilverFox malware relay (api.php) attempts to evade detection by returning a legitimate WeChat installer download link as a decoy response, rather than its intended malicious payload, when communicating with external analysis environments.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
Detects HTTP responses containing content that clones the RTX Corporation homepage, often associated with SilkParasite C2 infrastructure. The rule flags matches based on embedded text in the HTTP body combined with specific nginx server header fingerprints.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack targeting Microsoft 365. The rule identifies HTTP response bodies containing 'login.microsoftonline.com' and 'Enter Password' being served from a web server identified as 'openresty'. This configuration is common for phishing kits that proxy traffic between the victim and the legitimate service to harvest credentials and session cookies.
Detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, specifically communication with its geolocation harvester API, DNS lookups for the FlashProxy.io residential proxy service used for geolocation evasion, and identification of the proxy_ip in HTTP responses.
This rule detects attempts to exploit a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2024-21762) in FortiOS SSL-VPN by monitoring for malformed GET requests targeting the /remote/fgt_lang endpoint. The rule also tracks successful exploitation by identifying HTTP 200 responses containing Linux password file patterns (root:x:0:0:), indicating potential remote file disclosure.
Detects network activity associated with the SilverFox relay dispatcher, including specific cache-busting URI patterns, C2 infrastructure hosted on Cloudflare Workers, and the delivery of decoy WeChat installer links.
Detects network activity associated with the SilverFox malware, specifically targeting the discovery of relay endpoints via specific URI patterns containing cache-busting timestamps, DNS lookups for identified relay domains (noah-ssh.com.cn) and Cloudflare Workers subdomains, and suspicious HTTP response characteristics such as specific cache headers paired with wildcard CORS headers.
Detects network activity associated with the 'SilverFox' malware family's command-and-control relay dispatcher. The rules identify specific HTTP requests to 'api.php', responses containing 'download_link', and the serving of legitimate WeChat installer payloads as a fallback mechanism for evasion, including the use of cache-busting parameters.
Detects network indicators associated with the Exvicy ClickFix campaign, including HTTP callbacks to embed endpoints, DNS queries for the 'cloudflare-check.net' domain, direct connections to the identified C2 IP address (94.26.90.126), and HTTP responses containing fake 'Security Check' iframe content.
Detects malicious HTML pages commonly used in ClickFix-style phishing campaigns that intercept keyboard events (specifically blocking devtools and view-source shortcuts) and display fraudulent verification prompts to lure users into executing malicious actions.
Detects successful exploitation attempts targeting Vite development servers via chained access-control bypass vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-30208, CVE-2025-31125, CVE-2024-45811). The rule identifies malicious GET requests using the /@fs/ endpoint with specific query parameters, resulting in a successful HTTP 200 response, while originating from non-internal IP addresses.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
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