Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP GET requests to specific domains (microsoft-flash.com or wps-cn.com) attempting to download a file named 'flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe', which is associated with malicious installer activity.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting SonicWall SMA1000 WorkPlace endpoints. The rule monitors both HTTP GET query parameters and HTTP request bodies for patterns indicating attempts to redirect the application to internal loopback addresses or local network ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918 private subnets).
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
Detects anomalous HTTP traffic patterns identified in the 'Ted' backdoor used by North Korean-affiliated threat actors (APT37/Kimsuky/Lazarus). The rule specifically monitors the 'Accept-Language' HTTP header for a specific construction containing 'mrt=' followed by 'msc=' or 'mst=', which is used as a covert mechanism for authentication or command signaling.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of the curlRAT malware used by DPRK-affiliated threat actors. The detection looks for a specific POST body format containing 'name=', '&value=', and '&type=' parameters, which indicates C2 communication patterns commonly associated with this specific backdoor.
Detects potential NTLM relay attacks targeting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) web enrollment endpoints, including subsequent certificate requests for sensitive templates. This pattern identifies attackers attempting to relay NTLM authentication to AD CS and potentially requesting certificates for high-privilege templates (e.g., DomainController, SubCA, Machine, or User) to facilitate privilege escalation.
This rule detects suspicious HTTP POST requests to a /collect endpoint that contain tracking parameters (visitorId, stage, variant, events) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. These campaigns typically trick users into copying and pasting malicious code by simulating error prompts or CAPTCHAs.
Detects unauthorized HTTP requests to sensitive Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) API and administrative paths (/ers/, /admin/, /api/). The rule specifically looks for incoming requests that lack both an Authorization header and a Cookie header, which is indicative of potential exploitation attempts against vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-76460, where authentication mechanisms might be bypassed or ignored.
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-24472) involving authentication bypass via HTTP header manipulation (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For) and unauthorized access to the /jsconsole endpoint.
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-24472) involving authentication bypass via HTTP header manipulation (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For) and unauthorized access to the /jsconsole endpoint.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the MacSync stealer malware on macOS platforms. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('curl', 'dynamic', 'gate') combined with macOS-specific User-Agent strings and potential credential exfiltration headers, indicating established communication with a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects network traffic (TLS SNI and HTTP Host headers) attempting to connect to known command-and-control infrastructure associated with the NodeRabbit RAT and Mirage Kitten campaign. The rule monitors for unauthorized connectivity to specific domains including 'oracle-challenge.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com', 'plugplay.azurewebsites.net', and 'lifespotify.com'.
This rule detects network traffic associated with Lumma Stealer information-stealing malware, specifically identifying HTTP POST requests that utilize the 'TeslaBrowser/5.5' user agent. This pattern is indicative of the malware exfiltrating stolen data to its Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to domains using file-sharing or cloud-sync themed keywords in combination with specific top-level domains (TLD) often associated with suspicious infrastructure. The rule specifically excludes well-known legitimate services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox, Box, iCloud, and Google, and includes a detection threshold to minimize alerts for incidental traffic.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to domains using file-sharing or cloud-sync themed keywords in combination with specific top-level domains (TLD) often associated with suspicious infrastructure. The rule specifically excludes well-known legitimate services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox, Box, iCloud, and Google, and includes a detection threshold to minimize alerts for incidental traffic.
Detects network activity associated with the AgtaBackup RAT, specifically identifying custom HTTP headers for agent authentication, beaconing patterns to check-in endpoints, and establishment of WebSocket-based command and control channels.
Detects high-volume web crawling or reconnaissance activities originating from autonomous AI agent frameworks, such as AutoGPT, BabyAGI, LangChain, or CrewAI. These activities are identified by analyzing User-Agent strings and applying threshold-based rate limiting to identify potential automated reconnaissance patterns.
Detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header matches known strings associated with AI-powered penetration testing or reconnaissance agents, such as PentestGPT, AutoGPT, or AI-Recon tools.
Detects high-frequency POST requests to API endpoints, potentially indicative of automated fuzzing or brute-force parameter mutation attacks, by identifying 50 requests from a single source within a 10-second window.
Detects network traffic containing TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields associated with known 'jailbreak-as-a-service' LLM proxies, specifically WormGPT, FraudGPT, and EvilGPT. These services are often used by threat actors to generate malicious content, phishing emails, or exploit code.
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