Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects malicious network activity associated with TokenGrabber stealer malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP requests to public IP lookup services (api.ipify.org) followed by chained geolocation lookups (ip-api.com). This behavior is characteristic of an initial reconnaissance phase where the malware determines the victim's external network footprint.
This rule detects network traffic containing the specific 'Xwormmm' string in the payload, which serves as a handshake or banner characteristic of XWorm command-and-control (C2) communications.
Detects HTTP responses containing SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware delivery signatures. The rule monitors for a 200 HTTP status code, a content type of 'javascript', and the presence of the specific string 'NDSW' in the response body, which is a known indicator of the SocGholish JavaScript-based loader.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known blockchain RPC endpoints (bsc-dataseed and rpc.ankr.com) that utilize the 'eth_call' method. This behavior is associated with the ClearFake malware strain using the EtherHiding technique, where malicious scripts or payloads are hidden or retrieved via blockchain smart contracts.
This rule monitors HTTP traffic for requests containing 'bp.dat', which is associated with the registration phase of the Latrodectus malware downloader. It detects both URI-based and request body-based attempts by an infected host to register with a command and control server.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the SocGholish Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The rule identifies an HTTP 302 redirect response where the 'Location' header points to a URL containing 'update' and a .js extension, a characteristic behavioral signature used by SocGholish for its drive-by-download campaigns.
Detects outbound network traffic containing the hardcoded user-agent string 'Remcos', which is indicative of a Remcos RAT beacon communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule inspects HTTP requests to identify this specific malware signature within the established communication flow.
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to MEGA cloud storage, a technique associated with Akira ransomware campaigns.
This rule detects unauthorized or unauthenticated attempts to call the NetrServerPasswordSet2 method on a Domain Controller via the MS-NRPC (Netlogon) interface, which is indicative of an exploitation attempt related to CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon). This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass authentication and reset a Domain Controller's computer account password, leading to full domain compromise.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with ARToken-style OAuth device code phishing attacks, specifically monitoring for initial backend requests to Cloudflare Workers infrastructure, response payloads containing known phishing template indicators, and subsequent polling activity against device code endpoints that indicate an active phishing session.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal network hosts to a known hardcoded AsyncRAT C2 IP address (158.51.122.136). This indicates a successful infection where a host has established communication with the C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with a known malicious campaign using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages as a lure. This includes requests to retrieve tracker scripts from 'fsputnik.com', loading of fake verification pages from 'uasputnik.com', and communication with a known command retrieval endpoint ('admin777111777.php') potentially used for clipboard hijacking.
Detects HTTP and TLS traffic directed toward Vercel subdomains (vercel.app) that are consistent with known patterns for document-lure phishing or gated ZIP file distribution, often used for RMM-phishing campaigns.
Detects HTTP requests to Vercel deployment domains where the requested resource is a specific phishing kit asset ('font1.woff2'). This pattern is commonly associated with phishing campaigns hosted on free web hosting platforms.
Detects HTTP requests and responses involving the download of an executable file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' from the 'claude.ai' host, which is indicative of a malicious campaign distributing SectopRAT.
Detects specific C2 communication patterns associated with SCKIT, including HTTPS beaconing to the skyleen.fr domain and structured URI patterns used for configuration and status requests.
This rule detects outbound network beaconing from the SCKit malware to known command-and-control (C2) domains hosted on skyleen.fr or to a specific malicious IP address (139.84.223.178). The rule monitors both TLS SNI indicators in HTTPS traffic and direct IP connections to identify compromised hosts communicating with the attacker's infrastructure.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to OpenAI or Anthropic API endpoints originating from non-browser user agents (e.g., Python requests, curl, Go-http-client). This activity may indicate automated interactions, potentially for malicious purposes such as script-based interaction with LLMs or unauthorized API usage.
Detects repeated, small outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests to an external destination, a behavior characteristic of scripted command-and-control (C2) beaconing where a client periodically polls a server for instructions.
Detects large HTTP POST requests (exceeding 100KB) directed to public LLM API endpoints such as OpenAI or Anthropic. This behavior may indicate potential bulk data exfiltration or unauthorized sharing of sensitive data with external AI providers.
Detects high-frequency TCP SYN scanning activity originating from external networks targeting port 37777, commonly associated with the Dahua DVR P2P discovery service. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance and scanning campaigns searching for vulnerable IoT devices.
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