Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP requests from endpoints to a known C2 infrastructure associated with mobile device spyware. The rule identifies two specific stages: polling for new commands using a GET request and posting command execution results using a POST request, both targeting an MDM-mimicking API structure.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP and HTTP traffic to a known malicious infrastructure hosting a fake or compromised 'Corp MDM' (Mobile Device Management) admin panel, which serves as a Command and Control (C2) channel for spyware.
Detects an Android device registration attempt to a known malicious C2 IP address using parameters characteristic of a mobile device management (MDM) implant. The rule looks for a POST request to a specific registration endpoint containing device identifiers like deviceId, manufacturer, model, and osVersion.
Detects an Android device registration attempt to a known malicious C2 IP address using parameters characteristic of a mobile device management (MDM) implant. The rule looks for a POST request to a specific registration endpoint containing device identifiers like deviceId, manufacturer, model, and osVersion.
Detects an Android device registration attempt to a known malicious C2 IP address using parameters characteristic of a mobile device management (MDM) implant. The rule looks for a POST request to a specific registration endpoint containing device identifiers like deviceId, manufacturer, model, and osVersion.
Detects outbound network traffic and HTTP requests originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious infrastructure associated with 'Corp MDM'. The traffic includes C2 communication patterns, specific API URI paths, and potential login interactions on non-standard ports, consistent with phishing, malware delivery, or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects outbound network traffic and HTTP requests originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious infrastructure associated with 'Corp MDM'. The traffic includes C2 communication patterns, specific API URI paths, and potential login interactions on non-standard ports, consistent with phishing, malware delivery, or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the authentication bypass vulnerability in Dahua firmware (CVE-2021-33045) via the JSON-RPC interface. The attacker attempts to manipulate the 'loginType' and 'ipAddr' fields, specifically using 'Loopback' as the login type and '127.0.0.1' as the IP address to bypass security controls.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
This rule detects network communication (DNS queries and TLS connections) to known actor-controlled Slack workspace subdomains, as well as the presence of a specific hardcoded public key in Slack API traffic, suggesting the use of Slack as a Command and Control (C2) channel.
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