Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Sauron Loader malware family. It specifically identifies outbound HTTPS beaconing to known malicious C2 domains using the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) field.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects the handshake process of the frpc (Fast Reverse Proxy Client), which is associated with the RatHat malware family, attempting to register a reverse tunnel for command and control purposes.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to the URI path '/api/credentials' over the non-standard TCP port 8133, which is indicative of AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer exfiltrating stolen credentials to a C2 server.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, specifically targeting the 'Macfinger' variant. This involves detecting the fetching of obfuscated tracker JavaScripts (t.js), the delivery of deceptive 'Bot Protection' overlay HTML prompts used to trick users into executing malicious code, and network connections to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, specifically targeting the 'Macfinger' variant. This involves detecting the fetching of obfuscated tracker JavaScripts (t.js), the delivery of deceptive 'Bot Protection' overlay HTML prompts used to trick users into executing malicious code, and network connections to known C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic originating from the RatHat Android malware, specifically identifying the 'SCROLL_DOWN' command in HTTP response bodies. This suggests the malware is receiving instructions from a C2 server to perform UI automation or interaction tasks.
This rule detects malformed SCTP packets that trigger a protocol decoding error ('pkt_too_small'). This behavior is associated with the 'DiagSpill' vulnerability (CVE-2026-74469), where specially crafted chunk sequences in the SCTP stream can cause a remote service crash or potential instability. The rule includes a threshold to mitigate noise from non-malicious malformed packets.
Detects potential misuse of the WinGet configuration feature, where remote Desired State Configuration (DSC) YAML files are retrieved using masqueraded file extensions (e.g., .jpg or .txt) or suspicious outbound connections on port 8443, which may indicate an adversary attempting to hide malicious configurations or bypass network filtering.
Detects a specifically malformed IPv6 Routing Header (type 0) with a 'segments_left' value of 255 preceding an Authentication Header (AH). This signature targets an exploit pattern known as 'DirtyAH6', which aims to trigger a remote kernel crash or potential remote code execution on vulnerable systems by manipulating IPv6 header processing.
This rule detects internal hosts initiating outbound SSH connections to known public tunneling services (e.g., pinggy.io). Attackers frequently use these services to bypass network firewalls and create persistent reverse SSH tunnels for remote command-and-control access. The detection logic focuses on the identification of SSH protocol traffic headers combined with specific domain targeting or repetitive connection behavior.
Detects outbound network activity associated with the ChainScript malware family, including WebSocket C2 communication identified by a specific 'X-Agent-Token' header and TLS connections to known rotating command-and-control domains.
Detects outbound network traffic (TLS and HTTP) destined for the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). This pattern is often used by malicious actors for Command and Control (C2) communication, bot notifications, or data exfiltration, leveraging the legitimate Telegram infrastructure to hide malicious activity.
Detects the initialization sequence of the ORAX command-and-control framework, characterized by a handoff via a spoofed Cloudflare verification page followed by a WebSocket upgrade request.
This rule detects an HTTP GET request for 'static/js/main.js', a specific URI path associated with the JWR phishing framework's client-side engine. This indicates an interaction with a phishing infrastructure hosting malicious redirection or credential harvesting scripts.
This rule set detects network communication patterns associated with the AnonyMousKIT phishing kit, specifically targeting the exfiltration of captured user credentials to the Telegram Bot API and communication with known phishing panel infrastructure. It monitors for DNS lookups of 'anomkit.shop', established TCP connections to the associated backend relay, and HTTP requests containing specific credential-related keywords directed towards the Telegram API.
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