Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,309 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,251
27
22
7
2
Contributors
910
584
506
125
48
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
2,309
Platforms
2,196
209
169
62
61
Products / Services
2,253
2,159
165
32
31
MITRE Techniques
713
422
390
187
184
CVEs
17
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
995
426
281
190
98
IDS Protocols
1,291
401
281
117
45
This rule detects suspicious UDP traffic directed at port 8800 targeting the Dahua P2P cloud relay interface. It specifically monitors for enumeration attempts against device serial numbers, which may be a precursor to unauthorized access or reconnaissance against vulnerable Dahua devices.
Detects outbound RDP-over-TLS traffic directed toward known SilkParasite C2 IP addresses on specific high-numbered ports, or generic RDP-over-TLS patterns on those same non-standard ports, which suggests tunneling or unauthorized remote access.
Detection rules identifying suspicious communication patterns associated with Dahua P2P Cloud Relay devices, including WSSE authentication attempts and device probing to known cloud relay endpoints. These patterns are consistent with reconnaissance and exploitation activity against IoT devices within the context of Operation CameraSwarm.
Detects HTTP responses containing content that clones the RTX Corporation homepage, often associated with SilkParasite C2 infrastructure. The rule flags matches based on embedded text in the HTTP body combined with specific nginx server header fingerprints.
Detects network activity related to the exploitation of Dahua P2P relay services via easy4ipcloud.com. The rule monitors for unauthorized device probing, serial number enumeration, and illicit relay authentication attempts (e.g., using DHP2P protocols and X-WSSE authentication), which are indicative of attackers attempting to abuse IoT device remote access functionality (CVE-2025-31702).
Detects network activity related to 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. The rules monitor for DNS queries, TLS SNI requests, and HTTP requests to the malicious domain 'cdnsuicaches.com' used for hosting malicious scripts, as well as the identification of the 'cookie-captcha-complete' string in HTTP traffic, which is a known indicator of a ClickFix social engineering overlay.
Detects network activity related to Dahua P2P relay services (easy4ipcloud.com) on port 8800. The rules monitor for device lookup queries (/online/p2psrv/), probe requests (/probe/device/), and the presence of WSSE authentication headers, which may indicate interaction with or exploitation attempts by tools targeting P2P-enabled surveillance hardware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (/sendPhoto) that contain sensitive system information, including host credentials (port, login, password) and Shodan host data. This behavior is indicative of an information-stealing malware attempting to exfiltrate captured credentials via a Telegram bot.
Detects network communication with infrastructure associated with the Transparent Tribe threat group (APT36), including C2 traffic to a known malicious IP and DNS resolution for the sharema128.net domain, which are indicative of CrimsonRAT or Doxc malware activity.
Detects periodic beaconing and C2 communication patterns associated with the RapidRust Golang RAT, attributed to the APT36 (Transparent Tribe) threat group. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to typosquatted domains, TLS SNI mismatches, and specific HTTP API polling activities commonly used by this malware for C2 tasking.
Detects network traffic patterns indicative of a Netcat-based reverse shell associated with the UAT-11823 (Sandworm) threat group. The rule monitors for characteristic command output such as 'uid=' and 'gid=', shell error strings containing '/bin/sh', and root shell prompts ('root@#') following suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-20079.
Detects incoming HTTP requests to the WSO2 admin API endpoint that utilize a JSON Web Token (JWT) with the 'alg=none' algorithm, indicating an attempt to bypass authentication via JWT token forgery (CVE-2026-5430).
Detects attempts to exploit a vulnerability in WSO2 API Manager and Traffic Manager that allows for authentication bypass by utilizing a malformed JWT with the 'alg=none' header. Attackers can leverage this to impersonate users or bypass security controls by providing a crafted Bearer token in the Authorization header.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects HTTP traffic proxying Microsoft authentication paths (OAuth 2.0 authorization or CDN assets) via non-Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack using typosquatted infrastructure to intercept user sessions.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack targeting Microsoft 365. The rule identifies HTTP response bodies containing 'login.microsoftonline.com' and 'Enter Password' being served from a web server identified as 'openresty'. This configuration is common for phishing kits that proxy traffic between the victim and the legitimate service to harvest credentials and session cookies.
Detection rules designed to identify various stages of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaign, including malicious redirect chains (e.g., Google Meet/Ads redirects, AWS S3-hosted assets) and common lure patterns in SMTP traffic referencing voicemail portals.
Detection of suspicious DNS queries associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rules monitor for suspicious subdomains and TLD patterns targeting Microsoft login services, as well as behavioral sequences involving initial Google Ads traffic redirection followed by rapid lookups of suspected malicious or newly registered domains and external geolocation services.
Detects the abuse of the Google Meet 'linkredirect' service to facilitate phishing attacks, commonly used to bypass security filters and redirect users to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing landing pages.
Detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, specifically communication with its geolocation harvester API, DNS lookups for the FlashProxy.io residential proxy service used for geolocation evasion, and identification of the proxy_ip in HTTP responses.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to the known MoneroOcean mining pool over TLS (port 443). This behavior is indicative of XMRig or other cryptomining software communicating with a mining pool to exchange job data, often a sign of unauthorized resource hijacking.
Page 51 of 110