Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity associated with SilkParasite infrastructure, including the use of specific self-signed TLS certificates (swarm ca, proxy.local, 127.0.0.1) and connections to known malicious pivot domains such as socket.ayakliborsa.net or certificate subjects like *.scalefast.ninja.
Detects network traffic consistent with the download of XMRig cryptocurrency miner release tarballs from GitHub, typically used in malicious deployment scenarios including automated cron-triggered installations.
Detects a malicious command sequence targeting Redis instances where an attacker uses 'CONFIG SET' to modify the 'dir' and 'dbfilename' configuration directives followed by a 'SLAVEOF' or 'REPLICAOF' command. This is a common exploit pattern used to achieve remote code execution by forcing the Redis instance to load a malicious database file (often containing binary webshells or cron jobs) from an attacker-controlled server.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests containing a specific '/ping' URI pattern and 'h=' query string parameter, characteristic of Redis-based cryptomining botnet C2 heartbeat check-ins.
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware, specifically the use of 'frpc' (Fast Reverse Proxy Client) to establish a persistent reverse proxy tunnel. The rule monitors for established outbound connections containing the specific byte sequence characteristic of this tool, which is often used by adversaries to facilitate Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the specific '/api/node/register' URI, which is associated with the RatHat RAT command and control (C2) node registration behavior.
Detects network communication to Telegram API (api.telegram.org) indicative of HEAVYGRAM malware command and control (C2) beaconing. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the /sendMessage endpoint containing a chat ID and the hardcoded 'is online' message string, which is characteristic of this implant's check-in behavior.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests to a specific C2 domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online' masquerading as CSS file fetches. The request pattern uses a specific path '/google_api/' followed by predefined alphanumeric filenames, consistent with the KREMLIN malware browser extension's C2 polling mechanism.
This rule detects attempts to exploit a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2024-21762) in FortiOS SSL-VPN by monitoring for malformed GET requests targeting the /remote/fgt_lang endpoint. The rule also tracks successful exploitation by identifying HTTP 200 responses containing Linux password file patterns (root:x:0:0:), indicating potential remote file disclosure.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests resulting in the download of an Android Package (.apk) file where the host is not a known official Google Play or reputable third-party application distribution source. It further validates the detection by inspecting the HTTP response headers for the specific Android application package MIME type and the response body for indicators commonly associated with fake branded application portals.
Detects high-frequency connection attempts to TCP port 445 within the internal network or across RFC1918 subnets, indicating potential reconnaissance activity such as SMB share scanning commonly associated with lateral movement or network mapping.
Detects the usage of s5cmd, a command-line tool for S3, to communicate with AWS S3 endpoints. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration by an adversary using authorized cloud storage tools to move data out of the environment.
Detects anomalous network connection attempts using DCOM (port 135) or WinRM (ports 5985/5986) that originate from external networks or exceed established internal baseline frequencies. This pattern is often indicative of lateral movement or remote administration abuse via WMI or WinRM.
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