Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects established outbound TCP connections to a known AsyncRAT C2 IP address on port 4944. This rule identifies infected internal hosts communicating with a malicious server typically used for remote access and control.
Detects specific malformed HTTP request patterns associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. The rules identify suspicious beaconing attempts, including specific URI structures ('/$p', '/$or?u=') and malformed headers (missing Host header combined with specific Content-Length anomalies).
Detects specific malformed HTTP request patterns associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. The rules identify suspicious beaconing attempts, including specific URI structures ('/$p', '/$or?u=') and malformed headers (missing Host header combined with specific Content-Length anomalies).
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) directed towards the domain 'htlwub00klocate.blogspot.com', which is associated with adversary staging activity.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically looking for WebSocket handshake requests (HTTP GET with 'Upgrade' header) to domain names that follow a generated pattern (8-27 alphanumeric characters ending in .icu or .cfd).
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically looking for WebSocket handshake requests (HTTP GET with 'Upgrade' header) to domain names that follow a generated pattern (8-27 alphanumeric characters ending in .icu or .cfd).
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically looking for WebSocket handshake requests (HTTP GET with 'Upgrade' header) to domain names that follow a generated pattern (8-27 alphanumeric characters ending in .icu or .cfd).
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects high-frequency connection attempts to PPTP (1723) and L2TP (1701) VPN ports from an external source, indicative of automated scanning or vulnerability discovery activity.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at suspicious URI patterns associated with 'LeakySensey' logs. It specifically monitors for attempts to access transaction or compromise log endpoints, which could indicate an attacker attempting to enumerate leaked data or verify compromised credentials from an exposed log repository.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at suspicious URI patterns associated with 'LeakySensey' logs. It specifically monitors for attempts to access transaction or compromise log endpoints, which could indicate an attacker attempting to enumerate leaked data or verify compromised credentials from an exposed log repository.
Detects anomalous TLS traffic characterized by an empty Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake, combined with a high frequency of such connections. This behavior is indicative of certain proxy protocols like Xray VLESS with REALITY, which are often used to evade Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and traffic shaping policies by disguising C2 or tunneling traffic as legitimate-looking TLS connections.
This rule detects high-frequency TCP SYN connection attempts originating from external networks targeting common administrative or tunneling ports (1723/PPTP, 1701/L2TP, 22/SSH) on internal systems. The detection uses a threshold of 100 connection attempts within 120 seconds, which is characteristic of automated reconnaissance and network scanning behavior.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by monitoring for a two-stage pattern: a SignalR negotiation POST request followed by a WebSocket upgrade request to a suspicious domain structure. The pattern specifically targets lookalike domains featuring a random subdomain of at least 12 alphanumeric characters, which is indicative of ORAX-style AiTM infrastructure.
Detects outbound TLS traffic behavior consistent with the WaterPlum RAT, characterized by periodic, low-volume connections to non-CDN/cloud providers. The rule identifies potential beaconing activity by monitoring TLS SNI fields against a list of known legitimate service providers and applying a frequency threshold.
Detects network traffic associated with the SparroWocky/FamousSparrow C2 framework, including HTTP CONNECT proxy tunneling, SOCKS5 handshakes, and established TLS sessions to known malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects network activity associated with the PlugX RAT, specifically monitoring for DNS lookups of 'images.hcgtest.net', direct IP connections to '104.21.77.221', and HTTP requests to '/download/ar96rhqjgw2' using a user-agent containing 'curl'. This pattern indicates a compromised host attempting to download a PlugX archive.
Detects a specifically malformed IPv6 Routing Header (type 0) with a 'segments_left' value of 255 preceding an Authentication Header (AH). This signature targets an exploit pattern known as 'DirtyAH6', which aims to trigger a remote kernel crash or potential remote code execution on vulnerable systems by manipulating IPv6 header processing.
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