Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,309 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,251
27
22
7
2
Contributors
910
584
506
125
48
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
2,309
Platforms
2,196
209
169
62
61
Products / Services
2,253
2,159
165
32
31
MITRE Techniques
713
422
390
187
184
CVEs
17
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
995
426
281
190
98
IDS Protocols
1,291
401
281
117
45
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the RatHat Android malware. Specifically, it monitors for HTTP requests targeting the '/api/sapp' or '/api/bapp' URIs, which are used by this malware for C2 evasion or to retrieve its block list.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the HEAVYGRAM malware beaconing to Telegram's API. It identifies HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing specific URI strings and parameters, which suggests the bot is performing check-in activities or sending status updates via a Telegram bot channel.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
This rule detects potential exfiltration of sensitive files, specifically 'cert.pem' and 'private.key', via HTTP POST requests to the '/api/adbk/upload' endpoint. This pattern is characteristic of the RatHat malware attempting to exfiltrate device credentials to a Command and Control (C2) server.
This rule detects SQL injection attempts targeting the BuddyBoss members REST endpoint, specifically identifying exploitation patterns associated with the 'sqlmap' tool. The rule monitors for specific URL parameters including 'member_type', 'search_terms', and 'scope' in combination with an 'sqlmap' user-agent, indicating an automated exploitation attempt against the application.
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with the Chisel proxy/tunneling tool establishing a connection to an external VPS associated with the Miku threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific remote IP address on port 443, utilizing a threshold to reduce noise by ensuring multiple connection attempts occur.
Detects the initialization of an FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) protocol connection, characterized by a specific 3-byte null sequence followed by the 'frp' string marker in the packet header. This pattern is often associated with the RatHat malware using FRP to establish covert reverse tunnels for command-and-control communication.
This rule detects potential credential exfiltration by the RatHat malware, which attempts to upload 'cert.pem' and 'private.key' files to a remote server using a POST request to '/api/adbk/upload'.
Detects network beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the HEAVYGRAM backdoor, which utilizes the Telegram Bot API for remote interaction. This rule monitors for encrypted SNI traffic directed at api.telegram.org, as well as specific HTTP polling and command execution patterns (e.g., /getUpdates, /bot<token>/) indicating automated interaction with a Telegram bot controlled by an adversary.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) that contain suspicious 'fakePath' and 'fakePageName' parameters in the URI. These parameters are indicators of the 'GhostContainer' malware attempting to establish a socket forwarding proxy through the web server to facilitate command and control communications.
Detects anomalous MS_T120 channel binding and MCS handshake patterns characteristic of the BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft RDP services.
Detection rules identifying malformed RDP MCS Connect Initial PDUs and unusual service crashes following RDP connection attempts, both indicative of exploitation attempts against the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability.
Detection of suspicious network traffic directed toward Slack APIs, characterized by the use of hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific communication patterns associated with the 'indexed-btree' npm malware family, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects network traffic on non-standard ports (excluding port 443) where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains 'dl.google.com'. This pattern is frequently observed as a method for C2 tunneling tools like Xray-core to disguise malicious command and control traffic by masquerading as legitimate Google service traffic.
Detects network traffic attempting to use 'dl.google.com' as the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) header, which is a common indicator of Xray-core C2 tunneling or obfuscation. This rule identifies traffic attempting to masquerade as legitimate Google traffic and should be correlated with endpoint process information to confirm the initiating process is not a browser or authorized Google-related application.
Detects established SSH network connections originating from the internal network to external destinations on ports other than the standard port 22. This behavior is often associated with unauthorized SSH tunneling or command-and-control (C2) communication intended to bypass standard firewall egress filtering.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious POST requests to the Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) web interface that lack standard authentication headers (Cookie, Authorization, or X-Api-Token). This pattern is consistent with exploit attempts targeting CVE-2026-20079.
Detects repeated suspicious network requests, including non-standard HTTP methods and URI structures, as well as TLS SNI anomalies, targeting the internal sales portal 'agent.3bb.co.th'. The rule triggers when a threshold of 20 requests within a 60-second window is reached from a single source, indicating likely automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning activity.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests resulting in the download of an Android Package (.apk) file where the host is not a known official Google Play or reputable third-party application distribution source. It further validates the detection by inspecting the HTTP response headers for the specific Android application package MIME type and the response body for indicators commonly associated with fake branded application portals.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests resulting in the download of an Android Package (.apk) file where the host is not a known official Google Play or reputable third-party application distribution source. It further validates the detection by inspecting the HTTP response headers for the specific Android application package MIME type and the response body for indicators commonly associated with fake branded application portals.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to access lookalike subdomains mimicking Okta or Microsoft 365 identity provider login pages. This behavior is associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns, such as those attributed to UNC6671, where attackers use spoofed infrastructure to capture user credentials and session tokens.
Page 57 of 110