Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic (TCP and TLS) from internal hosts to known command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the FamousSparrow threat actor and their SparroWocky malware suite.
Detects outbound TLS and HTTP traffic directed towards 'testing.perplexity.com', an unlocked test subdomain reportedly associated with the BragJack campaign for AI agent hijacking. This indicates potential interaction with an adversary-controlled or compromised infrastructure used to intercept or manipulate AI agent sessions.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) directed towards the 'web12api.com' domain, as well as specific HTTP response structures commonly associated with adversary registration or command-and-control communication protocols.
Detects network communication with known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with Phantom Stealer malware. This rule monitors both outbound connections from the internal network and inbound traffic from the identified malicious infrastructure.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the SparroWocky malware, often used by the FamousSparrow threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP or TLS-encrypted connections on ports 443 and 8080 directed toward specific IP addresses identified as part of the C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API where the request body contains specific action keywords (e.g., VIEW or MOBILE). This pattern is often indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Telegram infrastructure to control compromised systems.
Detects outbound network connections (both TCP and TLS) from internal hosts to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the SparroWocky malware family. This rule monitors for established connections to a curated list of malicious IP addresses over ports 443 and 8080.
Detects outbound TLS connections from internal hosts to known IP addresses associated with the SparroWocky command-and-control infrastructure, including the specific byte sequence used during the TLS handshake to signal a ready state.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects HTTP GET requests to '/api.php?t=' containing a 13-digit timestamp identifier, followed by a response body containing 'download_link'. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relaying instructions or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
Detects high-frequency requests to the RubyGems legacy API key endpoint, which may indicate attempts to harvest or bruteforce developer API keys. The rule specifically monitors for request patterns involving variations like .yaml, .json, or parameter-based variants often observed in scanning activities.
Detects high-frequency requests to the RubyGems legacy API key endpoint, which may indicate attempts to harvest or bruteforce developer API keys. The rule specifically monitors for request patterns involving variations like .yaml, .json, or parameter-based variants often observed in scanning activities.
This rule detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting specific UK council ModernGov websites (e.g., Lambeth, Wandsworth, Southwark). It looks for outbound HTTP requests from non-browser clients (specifically identifying 'Ruby' in the User-Agent string) to these specific gov.uk domains, with a threshold to catch repeated attempts.
Detects network communication associated with Mantax Otax Android malware, including traffic to identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and attempts to retrieve dynamic configuration files from GitHub.
This rule detects network traffic directed to the subdomain 'testing.perplexity.com', which is identified as being associated with the BragJack campaign. This specific subdomain is leveraged by the campaign to facilitate browser session redirect bypasses, indicative of an attempt to intercept or manipulate user sessions.
This rule detects network traffic directed to the subdomain 'testing.perplexity.com', which is identified as being associated with the BragJack campaign. This specific subdomain is leveraged by the campaign to facilitate browser session redirect bypasses, indicative of an attempt to intercept or manipulate user sessions.
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