Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
Detects network activity associated with the Mantax/Otax Android malware family, specifically identifying C2 communication to the domain apimantax.otax.fun via TLS SNI and HTTP host headers, as well as potential dynamic C2 configuration retrieval via GitHub using the OkHttp client.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP requests to 'apimantax.otax.fun' attempting to initiate a WebSocket upgrade connection. This is characteristic of the Mantax Otax v2 malware family establishing a Command and Control (C2) channel.
Detects network communication to Firebase infrastructure (.firebaseio.com) initiated by Android devices, which may indicate command-and-control (C2) activity associated with the Mantax Otax malware family. This rule tracks initial connections and should be correlated with specific suspicious domains for higher confidence.
Detects network activity associated with the Mantax/Otax Android malware family, specifically identifying C2 communication to the domain apimantax.otax.fun via TLS SNI and HTTP host headers, as well as potential dynamic C2 configuration retrieval via GitHub using the OkHttp client.
Detects repeated manual HTTP GET requests from many distinct source IPs to a canary token resource. The URI pattern follows a format indicative of a tracked canary token resource, and the threshold of 49 unique source IPs accessing the resource within a prolonged period suggests potential unauthorized reconnaissance or probing activities.
This rule detects IDS/IPS or vulnerability management alerts triggered by exploitation attempts targeting the Cisco IOS XR control plane, specifically related to CVE-2026-20212.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects HTTP requests containing malicious JDBC strings targeting PaperCut NG/MF print management software, which are indicative of attempts to exploit authentication bypass and remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-81578, CVE-2026-82078).
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
Detects suspicious GET requests to the Magento '/customer/section/load/' endpoint with specific parameters ('sections=customer' and 'force_new_section_timestamp=true'). These requests are indicative of reconnaissance activity related to the StyleSmuggler campaign, potentially associated with exploitation of Magento vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-54236.
Detects inbound network connections from known IP addresses associated with the StyleSmuggler malware distribution, which is used to inject malicious scripts into web applications.
Detects outbound TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches the hardcoded domain 'ms.checrity.com', which is associated with ShadowPad backdoor activity.
Detects attempts to exploit the Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) by identifying JNDI lookups (ldap, rmi, http, ldaps, dns) in inbound HTTP traffic. These lookups are a hallmark of the Log4Shell attack vector, allowing for remote code execution.
Detects possible unauthenticated exploitation attempts against CVE-2025-53521 (F5 BIG-IP APM RCE). Tightened from a generic 'any POST without a cookie on 443/8443' match (extremely broad, alerts on ordinary cookie-less API/health-check traffic) to POST requests specifically targeting F5 APM access-policy processing endpoints (/my.policy, /vdesk/) that lack a session cookie, since the CVE requires an access policy configured on the virtual server and legitimate APM sessions carry a session cookie. Added detection_filter (3 hits/60s per source) to suppress single incidental matches and prioritize repeated attempts. Note: public reporting for this CVE does not include the exact exploit URI/payload, so this is a behavioral/namespace heuristic, not a payload-specific signature — validate against your own APM traffic baseline and update once exploit specifics are published.
Detects periodic heartbeat beaconing activity to the domain 'tt.yeyoujs.com' over both encrypted TLS (SNI observation on port 9443) and DNS queries. This pattern is indicative of a command-and-control (C2) channel establishing or maintaining persistence.
Detects periodic heartbeat beaconing activity to the domain 'tt.yeyoujs.com' over both encrypted TLS (SNI observation on port 9443) and DNS queries. This pattern is indicative of a command-and-control (C2) channel establishing or maintaining persistence.
Detects network requests originating from the Netch gateway tool or similar environments, attempting to fetch auto-configuration profiles for Shadowsocks from the external domain 'www.sheng886.top' using the '/api/v1/internal/shadowsocks/auto-config' endpoint. The rule specifically matches the Go-http-client user agent, which is common in automated scripts and Go-based proxy tools.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
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