Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,309 detections

Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
002
Detects multiple attempts to connect to administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) from a single source within a 60-second window. This pattern is indicative of automated lateral movement or enumeration attempts using the SMB protocol.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
104
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Alibaba OSS buckets hosting malicious AdaptixC2 payloads. This is associated with exploitation attempts against PaperCut MF software (referencing CVE-2026-82078 and CVE-2026-81578).
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects an exploitation attempt against PaperCut MF software leveraging SQL injection to deliver a Java bytecode loader (identified by the 'cafebabe' magic bytes) via a POST request.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
004
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
004
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
204
Detects repeated attempts to perform IIS 8.3 tilde short-filename enumeration. This reconnaissance technique exploits the legacy DOS 8.3 file naming convention to identify the existence and naming of files or directories on a Microsoft IIS web server.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
003
Detects outbound HTTP requests or TLS traffic to known C2 domains associated with APT28/UAC-0001 related to the CVE-2026-21509 campaign.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
107
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
24 days ago
000
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
000
Detects a network connection handshake indicating the use of Chisel, a fast TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP, specifically identifying potential command-and-control beaconing activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
24 days ago
000
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
000
This rule detects outbound network connections directed at a known IP address associated with Akira ransomware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with 64.227.4.134, which has been identified as a C2 node utilizing GOST tunnels. This behavior is indicative of established C2 connectivity by Akira ransomware actors.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
24 days ago
000
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where Kubernetes API resources (namespaces, secrets, configmaps, pods, or nodes) are enumerated, followed by a search query against the Slack API, indicative of a potential reconnaissance phase or sandbox escape attempt.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
104
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
004
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