Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,309 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,251
27
22
7
2
Contributors
910
584
506
125
48
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
2,309
Platforms
2,196
209
169
62
61
Products / Services
2,253
2,159
165
32
31
MITRE Techniques
713
422
390
187
184
CVEs
17
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
995
426
281
190
98
IDS Protocols
1,291
401
281
117
45
Detects a suspicious proxy authentication negotiation pattern involving multiple HTTP 407 challenges followed by a WebSocket upgrade and the establishment of a SOCKS5 tunnel, indicative of the BridgeHead adversary toolset.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to api.telegram.org originating from non-standard or unsigned processes. This rule is designed to identify potential data exfiltration by malware (such as stealers or trojans) using the Telegram Bot API as a C2 or exfiltration channel. It relies on a companion rule to establish flowbits for legitimate client traffic.
Detects inbound HTTP requests targeting specific hosts (photo.pokok.edu.hk, pta.sfaeps.edu.hk) with URI patterns associated with exploitation campaigns targeting vulnerabilities including CVE-2018-11511, CVE-2021-24139, CVE-2021-31755, and CVE-2021-32305.
Detects high-frequency outbound HTTP traffic matching specific URI patterns associated with potential Adaptix C2 beaconing behavior. The rule uses a sliding window threshold (10 requests within 600 seconds) to identify repetitive check-in patterns, which is a common characteristic of malware command-and-control channels.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity related to the NodeSnake RAT. It specifically identifies cleartext HTTP requests attempting to initiate a WebSocket upgrade (using the Sec-WebSocket-Key header) while the target host is specified as an IP address literal rather than a domain name, which is a common indicator of hardcoded or non-DNS-dependent C2 infrastructure.
Detects high-volume outbound SYN packet bursts from internal hosts to external networks, excluding known service ports. This behavior is indicative of a compromised host acting as part of a botnet conducting a SYN flood Denial of Service attack.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests to google.com that utilize a bare 'Mozilla/5.0' User-Agent header, which is indicative of the TOKYOCORE malware performing network connectivity checks. This behavior is atypical for standard browsers and can be used to identify potential beaconing activity.
This rule monitors outbound TLS traffic for Server Name Indication (SNI) fields matching known C2 or phishing domains associated with the JadeProx activity. This indicates a potential connection from an internal host to malicious infrastructure.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of suo5 and Neo-reGeorg web shell tunnels. These tools facilitate bidirectional communication through JSP endpoints (e.g., /jmx/suo5.jsp, /common/themes/top_css.jsp) by utilizing hardcoded proxy identifiers in HTTP headers. This behavior is indicative of a compromised web server acting as a pivot point for command-and-control operations.
Detects high-frequency HTTP GET request patterns indicative of bulk vulnerability scanning using the Nuclei scanner against public-facing web services. The rule triggers when a source IP initiates 250 or more requests within a 300-second window, excluding pre-authorized scanner source IP addresses.
This rule detects HTTP response bodies containing indicators associated with SourTrade malvertising campaigns, specifically JSON configuration fields and a base64-encoded Windows PE executable header (MZ/TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA).
This rule monitors DNS queries for the domain 'veyko-service.org', which is identified as being associated with the NodeSnake RAT (Remote Access Trojan). The detection indicates potential command-and-control (C2) activity where an infected host attempts to reach a malicious infrastructure domain.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed to Discord webhooks containing specific indicators associated with the TOKYOCORE ransomware, specifically identifying a unique User-Agent and a hardcoded exfiltration/C2 string in the request body.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a known malicious endpoint attempting to download a file named 'update_ms.msi', associated with the Chaos msaRAT trojan.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the AdaptixC2 framework. It identifies HTTP requests containing a specific 'X-Beacon-Id' header combined with known C2 URI patterns and a specific User-Agent string commonly observed in AdaptixC2 traffic.
Detects network traffic consistent with the SleeperGem loader communicating with a Forgejo instance hosted on git.disroot.org. The detection looks for GET requests containing specific path patterns (e.g., '/git-ecosystem/', '/raw/branch/main/') and file extensions (deploy.sh or git-credential-manager), along with a 'Git' user-agent, which is characteristic of the loader's C2 retrieval activity.
Detects DNS queries matching known malicious infrastructure domains identified in SourTrade malvertising campaigns. These domains are often used by threat actors to host malicious payloads or C2 infrastructure.
Detects a multi-stage network activity pattern characteristic of 'SourTrade' cloaking. The rule tracks an initial HTTP request with a referral to a known lookalike crypto/trading domain, followed by the fetching of a client-side JavaScript fingerprinting script, and finally, a subsequent HTTP response that appears to be a near-empty decoy page (used to mask malicious content from crawlers).
Detects HTTP request attempts to exploit WordPress vulnerabilities (associated with 'wp2shell' activity) targeting the 'author_exclude' or 'author__not_in' parameters with SQL injection payloads, such as sleep() functions or comment injection characters.
This rule detects the initial WebSocket handshake request used by the INTERLOCK NodeSnake RAT for beaconing. It looks for a GET request containing a 'Sec-WebSocket-Key' header and a specific URI pattern (?v=n;) common to the RAT's communication profile.
This rule detects UDP traffic patterns characteristic of the msaRAT C2 handshake. It specifically identifies initial WebRTC DataChannel connection frames containing the 0xFE marker combined with ChaCha-Poly1305 encryption indicators within the expected packet size range.
Page 85 of 110