Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to external networks that match a known Emotet C2 traffic pattern. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests using an 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Content-Type and a URI structure consisting of randomized alphanumeric segments (4-20 characters long). This structure is characteristic of Emotet's communication with its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot malware command and control (C2) activity. The rule identifies a specific combination of a hardcoded User-Agent string ('Trident/7.0') and a URI pattern consisting of 4 to 32 alphanumeric characters ending in .php.
Detects the use of the FTP STOR command to transfer files with sensitive extensions (.docx, .pdf, .xlsx, .zip, .7z) to external networks. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via an unencrypted alternative protocol.
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from internal network hosts to external destinations that match known Emotet C2 communication patterns, specifically those using hardcoded URI paths such as '/wp-content/', '/wp-admin/', or '/tmp/' combined with the 'Accept-Encoding: identity' header.
Detects a high frequency of incoming TCP SYN packets targeting port 3389 (RDP) from a single source within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against Remote Desktop services.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on non-standard ports that matches a specific JA3 fingerprint associated with the Sliver command and control framework. This indicates potential beaconing or C2 communication from a compromised host.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length is at least 10MB and the Content-Type header indicates the transfer of archived data (zip or x-tar). This pattern is often associated with the staging and exfiltration of compressed sensitive data from an internal host to an external network destination.
Detects HTTP requests attempting to access sensitive internal IP addresses (RFC-1918) or cloud metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254) which are common indicators of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) exploitation attempts.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of PsExec lateral movement, specifically identifying the authentication or access to the hidden 'ADMIN$' network share followed by the transfer or execution of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, a hallmark of the PsExec tool.
Detects repeated SSH connection attempts to a server over a short duration (10+ attempts in 60 seconds), which is characteristic of credential stuffing or brute-force password guessing attacks against the SSH service.
Detects network communication associated with AsyncRAT command-and-control activity. The rule identifies established outbound connections on non-standard ports (6606, 7707, 8808) containing a specific 3-byte null sequence header, which is indicative of AsyncRAT's communication protocol.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to 'pastebin.com' retrieving raw content, a technique commonly used by Ousaban malware to fetch command-and-control (C2) configurations from legitimate paste sites.
Detects DNS queries containing unusually long subdomains (50+ characters) encoded in Base64, which is a common technique used for command-and-control (C2) communication or data exfiltration via DNS tunneling.
Detects HTTP requests containing a UNION SELECT pattern in the URI query string, which is a common indicator of a SQL injection attempt aimed at exfiltrating data or manipulating database queries.
Detects anomalous DCOM RPC bind requests on port 135 targeting WMI-related interfaces, which is a common indicator of lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) over DCOM.
This rule monitors network traffic over the Telnet protocol (TCP port 23) for patterns indicative of Mirai botnet propagation. It identifies sequences of characters commonly used in Mirai brute-force attempts to guess default credentials (e.g., 'admin' followed by 'password'). The rule utilizes a threshold-based detection filter to trigger only when multiple such attempts are observed from a single source within a 60-second window, helping to filter out individual noise and focus on active scanning behavior.
This rule detects HTTP directory traversal attempts by inspecting incoming URI requests for common path traversal sequences such as '../', '..%2F', '..%2f', '..%5C', or '..%5c'. Attackers use these sequences to escape the web root directory and access unauthorized files on the server.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts using Windows Remote Management (WinRM) by monitoring for specific WSMan SOAP protocol headers in HTTP traffic. It specifically looks for POST requests to the WSMan endpoint that contain suspicious keywords like 'winrs', 'MSRPC', or 's:Envelope', which are commonly associated with remote command execution via winrs or PSSession.
Detects HTTP GET requests for .msc (Microsoft Management Console) files, which can be leveraged as part of an attack chain to abuse the mmc.exe binary for proxy execution of malicious configurations.
Detects the transmission of a Portable Executable (PE) file header ('MZ' and 'PE' magic bytes) within an HTTP response stream, which is a common indicator of a staged file download or process injection payload being delivered over the network.
Detects SMB traffic patterns containing commands indicative of file obfuscation or permission tampering, specifically the use of 'attrib' to set hidden or system attributes, 'icacls' to deny access to files, or PowerShell execution with the '-WindowStyle Hidden' argument.
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