Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects unauthorized attempts to modify or patch the AmsiScanBuffer function within amsi.dll in a remote process. This behavior is indicative of an AMSI bypass attempt, a technique often used by malicious loaders and fileless malware to evade security product scanning.
Detects the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader's AMSI-bypass routine by monitoring for the suspicious concurrent loading of amsi.dll and .NET runtime modules (clr.dll, mscoree.dll, or coreclr.dll) within the same process. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to hook into the AMSI interface to disable security scanning before executing malicious payloads.
Detects the loading of wkspbroker.exe or radcui.dll modules from the Microsoft RemoteApp Gateway directory located within the user's AppData path. This behavior may indicate an attempt to utilize or manipulate Remote Desktop components from a non-standard or user-writable location.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potentially malicious in-memory activity within the 'GRrte.exe' process, specifically targeting behaviors associated with PlugX malware. It monitors for suspicious memory protection changes (e.g., requests for Read-Write-Execute permissions) and the loading of the 'ws2_32.dll' library, which is commonly used to facilitate network communication in side-loaded payloads.
Detects instances of the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) loading graphics-related libraries such as System.Drawing.dll or gdiplus.dll. These modules are typically not required by charmap.exe and their loading is a common indicator of process injection for the purpose of capturing the screen or desktop interface.
Detects the loading of the Restart Manager DLL (rstrtmgr.dll) by suspicious processes, such as those running from writable user paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or masquerading as numeric-only named executables. Adversaries may abuse this library for process termination or interaction to facilitate malicious operations, such as clearing file locks during deployment.
Detects the execution of rnpkeys.exe dropped by an MSI installer (msiexec.exe) from the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory. The rule specifically monitors for side-loading of the rnp.dll or tdwp.dll libraries by rnpkeys.exe, a technique associated with the Sauron loader.
Detects the loading of 'clr.dll' and 'System.Management.Automation.dll' (or related variants) by a process that is not a known PowerShell host. This behavior is indicative of a 'PSInline' execution technique, where an attacker leverages COM or direct assembly loading to execute PowerShell scripts or commands within a benign or malicious process to avoid spawning explicit powershell.exe processes.
Detects attempts to patch or disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) functionality by identifying memory modification operations targeting the 'EtwEventWrite' function or direct memory protection changes within 'ntdll.dll'. This is a common technique used by malware and post-exploitation tools to blind security telemetry.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the interaction between Claude Desktop and the CEF (Chromium Embedded Framework) library, which may indicate unauthorized plugin or extension loading; second, the execution of non-standard binaries initiated by various JetBrains IDE processes located outside of standard program directories, which could indicate process hollowing or unauthorized tool execution.
Detects instances where the RemoteApp Gateway broker process (wkspbroker.exe) loads the 'radcui.dll' module from the 'AppData\Local\Microsoft\RemoteApp\Gateway' directory. This behavior, especially when accompanied by configuration artifacts like 'config.json' or 'comsrv.dat' in the same path, is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or application hijacking, as these components are typically expected to reside in system-protected directories rather than user-writable local paths.
Detects the loading of radcui.dll by the WkspBroker.exe process when the DLL is located within a path associated with Microsoft RemoteApp Gateway, which is often indicative of DLL sideloading or execution hijacking of a legitimate process.
This rule detects the execution of the SentinelOne memory scanner process (SentinelMemoryScanner.exe) or the loading of the associated SentinelOne core library (SentinelAgentCore.dll) from a directory path outside of the standard SentinelOne installation locations (Program Files\SentinelOne or Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne). This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or tampering where an adversary attempts to execute a renamed or moved security tool to bypass policy or evade detection.
Detects the execution of an unsigned, non-Apple binary initiated via xpcproxy that subsequently loads 'libpam.2.dylib' within a two-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a PamStealer-style attack, where a malicious or spoofed process attempts to harvest user credentials by leveraging system PAM libraries for validation.
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