Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of the SentinelOne memory scanner process (SentinelMemoryScanner.exe) or the loading of the associated SentinelOne core library (SentinelAgentCore.dll) from a directory path outside of the standard SentinelOne installation locations (Program Files\SentinelOne or Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne). This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or tampering where an adversary attempts to execute a renamed or moved security tool to bypass policy or evade detection.
Detects the loading of 'libcurl.dll' or related DLL patterns from suspicious directories such as '\Microsoft\Crypto\RuntimeBroker\', often associated with process masquerading or side-loading activities. The rule also monitors for the execution of suspicious binaries ('Tax_Notice_45594.exe') or binaries that mimic 'Notepad++' metadata from within these paths.
This rule detects potential anti-debugging behavior characteristic of the ConfuserEx packer. It identifies processes that repeatedly poll for debugger presence (using APIs such as Debugger.IsAttached, Debugger.IsLogging, or CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) at approximately 1-second intervals, culminating in a call to Environment.FailFast to terminate execution if a debugger is detected.
This rule detects potential anti-debugging behavior characteristic of the ConfuserEx packer. It identifies processes that repeatedly poll for debugger presence (using APIs such as Debugger.IsAttached, Debugger.IsLogging, or CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) at approximately 1-second intervals, culminating in a call to Environment.FailFast to terminate execution if a debugger is detected.
Detects instances of vsdbg.exe (Visual Studio Debugger) loading vsdbg.dll from suspicious, temporary, or user-controlled locations (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) when initiated from a path outside of the standard Microsoft Visual Studio installation directories. This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or side-loading of the debugger utility by an attacker.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the interaction between Claude Desktop and the CEF (Chromium Embedded Framework) library, which may indicate unauthorized plugin or extension loading; second, the execution of non-standard binaries initiated by various JetBrains IDE processes located outside of standard program directories, which could indicate process hollowing or unauthorized tool execution.
This rule detects when a DLL containing 'python' in its filename is loaded by a process that is not an identified Python interpreter or the dropbox.exe application. The rule specifically filters for these DLLs being larger than 10MB, which may indicate the use of embedded Python environments to facilitate malicious code execution or side-loading.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) is spawned by suspicious processes or PowerShell, and subsequently loads clr.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or process injection techniques used by malware to execute arbitrary code within a trusted system process context.
Detects the loading of rstrtmgr.dll by processes other than known Windows installers, update services, or explorers. The Restart Manager API is often abused by ransomware to terminate processes holding file locks, facilitating the encryption of files that would otherwise be in use.
Detects the loading of 'libcurl.dll' or related DLL patterns from suspicious directories such as '\Microsoft\Crypto\RuntimeBroker\', often associated with process masquerading or side-loading activities. The rule also monitors for the execution of suspicious binaries ('Tax_Notice_45594.exe') or binaries that mimic 'Notepad++' metadata from within these paths.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll or clr.dll into the charmap.exe process. Adversaries often inject malicious code into legitimate, system-native processes like charmap.exe to bypass detection and perform in-memory patching of security controls, such as disabling AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface).
This rule detects the suspicious loading of known SparroWocky loader DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll) into a process, followed by that same process loading graphics-related libraries (gdi32.dll, gdi32full.dll, or user32.dll) within a 10-minute window. This behavioral pattern is indicative of the backdoor's screen-capture capability, as these GDI/User32 modules are required for capturing screen content.
Detects the execution or loading of specific components (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll) associated with the SparroWocky malware framework, or suspicious image load events lacking a defined module path that typically precede reflective mapping.
Detects high-frequency loading of core Windows GDI libraries (gdi32.dll, gdi32full.dll, user32.dll) by the ProcAuditManager.exe process, which is indicative of screen capture activity associated with the SparroWocky malware's persistence and data exfiltration capabilities.
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading activity by identifying when known malicious file hashes are loaded by a specific set of executable files that are commonly abused for side-loading, or when these executables are executed from locations outside of their standard, verified installation directories.
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
This rule detects the loading of a module named 'MicDriver.dll' or the execution of a process named 'MicDriver.exe'. These filenames are potentially indicative of malicious activity using masquerading or attempts to hijack execution flow using filenames that resemble legitimate audio drivers.
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Detects behavioral indicators consistent with local privilege escalation targeting Windows ALPC subsystem vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-85880). The rule correlates: 1) Unsigned or low-prevalence processes loading sensitive ALPC-related DLLs (rpcss.dll, ntdll.dll), 2) Subsequent crashes or restarts of critical ALPC-handling system components (lsass.exe, RPCSS, wuauserv), and 3) The generation of a new SYSTEM-level process by a parent that was not previously running as SYSTEM within a short temporal window.
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