Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,161 detections
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Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
Sweeps file, process and image-load telemetry for known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) malware MD5 hashes. Exact hash matches carry very low false-positive risk.
Detects network connections, process executions, file creations, and image loads associated with the UNC7017 AOMEI supply chain campaign IOC sweep, including specific malicious URLs, domains, IPs, file paths, and hashes.
Correlates a Webcam.dll image load with VM-detection commands (such as queries for VirtualBox, VMware, vbox, vmtoolsd, Win32_ComputerSystem, or Win32_BIOS) executed by the same RegSvcs.exe process, which is characteristic of XWorm malware behavior.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc
Detects network connections, process executions, file creations, and image loads associated with the UNC7017 AOMEI supply chain campaign IOC sweep, including specific malicious URLs, domains, IPs, file paths, and hashes.
Sweeps file, process and image-load telemetry for known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) malware MD5 hashes. Exact hash matches carry very low false-positive risk.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
The following analytic detects "cldapi.dll" being loaded by a process not associated with legitimate cloud sync activity.
The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.
The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.
Detects network connections, process executions, file creations, and image loads associated with the UNC7017 AOMEI supply chain campaign IOC sweep, including specific malicious URLs, domains, IPs, file paths, and hashes.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Sweeps file, process and image-load telemetry for known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) malware MD5 hashes. Exact hash matches carry very low false-positive risk.
Sweeps file, process and image-load telemetry for known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) malware MD5 hashes. Exact hash matches carry very low false-positive risk.
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
Detects network connections, process executions, file creations, and image loads associated with the UNC7017 AOMEI supply chain campaign IOC sweep, including specific malicious URLs, domains, IPs, file paths, and hashes.
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
The following analytic identifies potential DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading by detecting known Windows libraries loaded from non-standard directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL loads and cross-references them with a lookup of known hijackable libraries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code by exploiting DLL search order vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
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