Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DLL side-loading attacks where consent.exe loads known malicious DLLs (version.dll, rtworkq.dll, wmsgapi.dll, and the older msimg32.dll) from non-standard locations. This technique is used by Shanya-packed malware including EDR Killer and CastleRAT to load malicious payloads while appearing as a legitimate Windows UAC process.
Detects instances where CRYPTBASE.dll is loaded from a non-standard Windows directory, indicating potential DLL sideloading to deploy STX RAT.
Detects the loading of UnityPlayer.dll from unexpected paths such as Temp or WebViewFixUtility. This behavior indicates potential DLL sideloading, as observed in Operation Dragon Weave, where RuntimeBroker_update.exe or BrowserViewUtility.exe loads a malicious UnityPlayer.dll (Rustcloak) to execute the Azureveil payload.
Detects the loading of a malicious DLL by explorer.exe. This DLL is responsible for extracting a shellcode payload from a PNG file using steganography, a technique observed in the APT28 Phantom Net Voxel campaign.
Identifies the SHA-256 hash associated with the BLUEBEAM (Godzilla) web shell payload (LoadLibrary.dll) dropped during KnowledgeDeliver exploitation. This rule looks for the specific hash across file creation, image load, or process execution events.
This rule detects various suspicious activities associated with a cryptojacking campaign, including the execution of 'RuntimeHost.exe' from unusual directories, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, DLL side-loading followed by silent MSI execution, process hollowing into .NET utilities, Windows Defender exclusion attempts, and persistence mechanisms via startup folder shortcuts and registry run keys. These activities are indicative of an attacker establishing persistence and evading defenses to perform unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.
This rule detects the loading of modules (DLLs or executables) from user-specific AppData folders that are not commonly observed across the environment. It specifically excludes common legitimate paths within AppData like 'Local\Programs' and 'Local\Temp' to reduce false positives. The rule identifies modules loaded by processes that also originate from an AppData folder, indicating potentially suspicious activity such as malware or custom tools operating from user-writable locations.
Detects execution of CRYPTBASE.dll from non‑system directories, a technique used in the STX RAT campaign to hijack legitimate installers (e.g., CPUID HWMonitor, X‑VPN).
Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library.
Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc.
Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sideload vcruntime140.dll for executing malicious code.
Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc.
Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sideload vcruntime140.dll for executing malicious code.
Detects VSLauncher.exe execution or image loading involving input.dll under SysWOW64, indicative of DLL side-loading by the UAC-0184 threat actor.
This rule detects the loading of modules (DLLs or executables) from user-specific AppData folders that are not commonly observed across the environment. It specifically excludes common legitimate paths within AppData like 'Local\Programs' and 'Local\Temp' to reduce false positives. The rule identifies modules loaded by processes that also originate from an AppData folder, indicating potentially suspicious activity such as malware or custom tools operating from user-writable locations.
This rule identifies various indicators of Mimikatz execution, including specific command-line arguments, file names, suspicious access to the LSASS process memory, and the creation or loading of malicious services or DLLs associated with Mimikatz. It aims to detect credential dumping activities and persistence mechanisms often employed by attackers.
This rule detects multiple TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) associated with advanced adversaries, including QEMU virtualization abuse for defense evasion, creation of malicious scheduled tasks (specifically 'TPMProfiler'), rogue account or service creation (e.g., 'CtxAppVCOMService' or 'AppMgmt' service via 'sc.exe'), port forwarding/tunneling commands (using 'ssh' or 'portproxy' with specific ports), credential access attempts via 'vssuirun.exe' or printing 'NTDS.dit', and potential DLL sideloading involving 'ADNotificationManager.exe' and 'vcruntime140_1.dll'. It also includes IOCs for specific IPs, domains, and file hashes.
This rule detects the execution or writing of a file with a specific SHA256 hash associated with the 'GateKeeper' payload. It monitors process creation events, new executable writes, PE file writes, and image loads on Windows platforms to identify the presence and activity of this known malicious file.
This query searches for multiple indicators associated with the STAC4713 and STAC3725 campaigns (often linked to PayoutsKing/GOLD ENCOUNTER). It utilizes a fast free-text pre-filter followed by a case statement to categorize specific TTPs, including QEMU abuse, rogue scheduled tasks, suspicious services/accounts, covert tunneling, and credential access.
Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories.
These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes.
These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes.
Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
Detects potential DLL sideloading activity via the Aruba Networks Virtual Intranet Access "arubanetsvc.exe" process using DLL Search Order Hijacking
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "chrome_frame_helper.dll"
Detects image load events of system control panel items (.cpl) from uncommon or non-system locations that may indicate DLL sideloading or other abuse techniques.
Detects potential DLL side-loading of jli.dll.
JLI.dll has been observed being side-loaded by Java processes by various threat actors, including APT41, XWorm,
and others in order to load malicious payloads in context of legitimate Java processes.
JLI.dll has been observed being side-loaded by Java processes by various threat actors, including APT41, XWorm,
and others in order to load malicious payloads in context of legitimate Java processes.
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