Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,161 detections
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Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects windows utilities loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL.
Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code.
Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code.
Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.
Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL by a potentially uncommon or potentially suspicious process.
The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.
The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.
Detects processes loading "System.Drawing.ni.dll". This could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This query is looking for regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe loading DLL images with other extensions than .dll.
Joins the data to public network events.
References:
https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/
Joins the data to public network events.
References:
https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/
Detects the load of advapi31.dll by a process running in an uncommon folder
PowerShell Execution
Sigma
Detects execution of PowerShell
Detects DLL load activity of known compromised DLLs used in by the compromised 3CXDesktopApp
Hunts known SVR-specific DLL names.
Detects potential CSharp Streamer RAT loading .NET executable image by using the default file name and path associated with the tool.
This query will hunt for files matching the current abuse.ch recent threat feed based on Sha256. Currently the query is set up to analyze the last day worth of events, but this is configurable using the MaxAge variable.
Detects processes loading the non-existent DLL "ShellChromeAPI". One known example is the "DeviceEnroller" binary in combination with the "PhoneDeepLink" flag tries to load this DLL.
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects the image load of vss_ps.dll by uncommon executables
Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library
Detects potential DLL sideloading using JUSTSYSTEMS Japanese word processor
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "appverifUI.dll"
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "MpSvc.dll".
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