Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the suspicious loading of DLLs by spoolsv.exe, potentially indicating PrintNightmare exploitation. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where spoolsv.exe loads multiple DLLs from the Windows System32 spool drivers x64 directory. This activity is significant as it may signify an attacker exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the loading of four specific Windows DLLs (credui.dll, dbghelp.dll, samcli.dll, winhttp.dll) by a non-standard process. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL load events and flags when all four DLLs are loaded within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of Brute Ratel C4, a sophisticated remote access tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, credential theft, and further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects when DLLs with known abuse history are loaded from an unusual location. This activity may represent an attacker performing a DLL search order or sideload hijacking technique. These techniques are used to gain persistence as well as elevate privileges on the target system. This detection relies on Sysmon EID7 and is compatible with all Official Sysmon TA versions.
The following analytic detects the creation of potentially malicious unsigned DLLs in the c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64 folders. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 logs to identify unsigned DLLs with unavailable signatures loaded in these critical directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DLL hijacking attempt, a technique used by attackers to gain unauthorized access and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to privilege escalation, allowing the attacker to gain elevated privileges and further compromise the target system.
The analytic identifies the loading of the malicious SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe and subsequent DNS queries to avsvmcloud.com. It uses Sysmon EventID 7 for DLL loading and Event ID 22 for DNS queries, correlating these events within a 12-14 day period. This activity is significant as it indicates potential Sunburst malware infection, a known supply chain attack. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized network access, data exfiltration, and further compromise of the affected systems.
The following analytic identifies all drivers being loaded on Windows systems using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). It leverages fields such as driver path, signature status, and hash to detect potentially suspicious drivers. This activity is significant for a SOC as malicious drivers can be used to gain kernel-level access, bypass security controls, or persist in the environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to severe system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
Detects potentially suspicious loading of "ksproxy.ax", which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-35250. This vulnerability allows for privilege escalation.
Detects Clfs.sys being loaded by a process running from a potentially suspicious location. Clfs.sys is loaded as part of many CVEs exploits that targets Common Log File System (CLFS) driver vulnerabilities. The rule identifies processes loading 'clfs.sys' from common temporary or user-writable directories often abused by malware or exploits.
Detects Clfs.sys being loaded by a process running from a potentially suspicious location. Clfs.sys is loaded as part of many CVEs exploits that targets Common Log File.
Detects attempted file load events that did not meet the signing level requirements. It often means the file's signature is revoked or a signature with the Lifetime Signing EKU has expired. This event is best correlated with EID 3089 to determine the error of the validation.
Detects image load events of system control panel items (.cpl) from uncommon or non-system locations which might be the result of sideloading. This technique can be used for defense evasion by masquerading malicious code as legitimate system components.
Detects the loading of 'EvtMuteHook.dll' based on its unique IMPHASH. This DLL is a component of SharpEvtHook/EvtMute, a tool designed to tamper with Windows event logs to evade detection. The rule specifically looks for the known IMPHASH of this malicious DLL.
Detects the loading of specific malicious DLLs (ffmpeg.dll, d3dcompiler_47.dll, and an ICONIC Stealer payload) that were identified as compromised and used in attacks involving the 3CXDesktopApp. This rule uses SHA256, SHA1, and MD5 hashes to identify the malicious DLLs.
This rule detects when the 'RstrtMgr.dll' (Restart Manager) library is loaded by a process that is not part of the common legitimate Windows processes or typical software installation paths. Adversaries, particularly ransomware and wiper malware, have been observed using this DLL to terminate processes that might interfere with their operations, such as file encryption or data destruction. This can include killing processes that lock files, preventing encryption, or for anti-analysis purposes.
Detects the loading of the Windows Restart Manager (RstrtMgr.dll) by a process executing from a suspicious directory. This DLL has been observed in ransomware campaigns (e.g., Conti, Cactus) and wipers (e.g., BiBi) to terminate processes that might lock files, facilitating encryption or data destruction. It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes.
Detects suspicious DLL loads by the Windows Print Spooler service from its backup driver folders. This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts related to vulnerabilities like PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527) where an attacker can force the spooler service to load arbitrary DLLs, leading to privilege escalation or remote code execution.
Detects the loading of a malicious 'version.dll' from the 'C:\Windows\ADFS\' directory, a technique used by the NOBELIUM threat group with their FoggyWeb backdoor to achieve DLL hijacking.
Detects when Code Integrity identifies and blocks the loading of an image (DLL, EXE, etc.) that has a revoked digital certificate. This indicates an attempt to load untrusted or malicious code, potentially bypassing security controls. Event ID 3035 specifically notes cases where the image is allowed to load due to a kernel mode debugger being attached, which is a highly suspicious activity.
Detects when an unsigned image (DLL, EXE, etc.) is loaded into the system, as reported by Windows Code Integrity. This can indicate attempts to bypass security controls, execute malicious code, or privilege escalation.
Detects a specific image load pattern where 'svchost.exe' loads 'clfsw32.dll'. This pattern has been observed in the context of a tool named PRIVATELOG, which is associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) activities, and is considered rare under legitimate circumstances. This behavior could indicate process injection or other forms of defense evasion.
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