Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,161 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
517
470
72
54
20
Contributors
259
229
161
156
125
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
1,161
Platforms
1,140
28
18
1
Products / Services
427
403
35
18
15
MITRE Techniques
812
471
460
439
429
CVEs
6
6
5
5
3
Detects the loading of `dbghelp.dll` or `dbgcore.dll` by processes that are typically not expected to load these DLLs. These DLLs export functions like `MiniDumpWriteDump` which can be used to dump process memory, including sensitive information like credentials from processes such as LSASS. This behavior is often observed in attacker tradecraft, such as with the SilentTrinity C2 Framework, or by legitimate debugging tools like ProcessHacker. The rule includes filters for common legitimate Windows processes and services that might load these DLLs to reduce false positives. Investigation of the command line and image location of the process loading the DLL is recommended.
This rule detects attempts to load an image (e.g., a DLL or executable) that has been blocked by Windows Code Integrity because its signing certificate has been revoked. This indicates that a potentially malicious or untrusted module is trying to execute on the system, and the operating system's integrity checks are preventing it.
Detects when an Office application loads the 'kerberos.dll' library. This behavior is unusual for standard Office operations and could indicate an attempt to manipulate Kerberos authentication, potentially for credential access or privilege escalation.
This rule detects when the "System.Drawing.ni.dll" library is loaded by a process. This DLL is often used for graphical operations, including screen capturing. Its loading can indicate an attempt to capture screen content, which is a common technique used by adversaries for reconnaissance or data exfiltration.
Detects cmstp loading "dll" or "ocx" files from suspicious locations, which is a known technique for defense evasion and proxy execution. Adversaries can abuse CMSTP.exe, a legitimate Microsoft binary, to load and execute malicious DLLs or OCX files from non-standard directories, potentially bypassing application whitelisting and other security controls.
Detects when a .NET assembly DLL from the Windows assembly cache (C:\Windows\assembly\) is loaded by a Microsoft Office application. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious code or achieve persistence through Office applications by leveraging .NET assemblies.
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). This rule specifically looks for `wmic.exe` loading scripting libraries like `jscript.dll` or `vbscript.dll`.
Detects a suspicious DLL load by an "svchost" process based on location and name that might be related to ColdSteel RAT. This DLL location and name has been seen used by ColdSteel as the service DLL for its persistence mechanism.
Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicate WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers activity. This is a common technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations. This rule identifies when specific DLLs (coreclr.dll, facesdk.dll, HPCustPartUI.dll, libcef.dll, ZIPDLL.dll) are loaded from unusual or suspicious directories, such as Perflogs, Users\Public, Temporary Internet Files, Windows\Temp, or various user profile subdirectories like Favorites, Favourites, Contacts, and Pictures. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code by tricking a legitimate application into loading a malicious DLL from an unexpected path.
Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file. Adversaries may use malicious Excel Add-Ins to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or perform other malicious activities. This rule specifically looks for the loading of '.xll' files by 'excel.exe'.
This rule detects when 'credui.dll' or 'wincredui.dll' is loaded by a process that is not commonly associated with these DLLs. Attackers might load these DLLs to interact with Windows Credential Provider functions like 'CredUIPromptForCredentials' or 'CredUnPackAuthenticationBufferW' to prompt users for credentials or extract them.
Detects the loading of a DLL associated with the SILENTTRINITY stager, specifically looking for the string 'st2stager' in the DLL's description.
This rule detects when an unsigned image (DLL or EXE) is loaded into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. Adversaries often inject malicious, unsigned code into LSASS to dump credentials, as LSASS stores sensitive authentication material. Detecting unsigned code in this critical process can indicate an attempt at credential dumping or other forms of privilege escalation.
This rule detects when a Common Language Runtime (CLR) DLL, specifically 'clr.dll', is loaded by any of the specified Microsoft Office applications (Excel, Publisher, Outlook, OneNote, PowerPoint, Word). This activity can be indicative of malicious code execution, as adversaries might leverage CLR to execute .NET assemblies within the context of a legitimate Office process, potentially bypassing security controls or achieving persistence.
Detects when a DLL from the Global Assembly Cache (GAC) is loaded by a Microsoft Office application. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as DLL hijacking or persistence mechanisms, where an attacker might try to load their own malicious DLLs disguised as legitimate GAC assemblies through Office applications.
This rule detects when Microsoft Excel loads an Add-In (.xll) file from an uncommon or potentially suspicious location. Adversaries often use XLL files for initial access or execution by embedding malicious code within them, and loading them from non-standard directories like Desktop, Downloads, Temp, or Public user folders can indicate malicious activity. The rule specifically looks for excel.exe loading an .xll file from a predefined list of suspicious directories.
Detects the loading of unsigned dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll, which are DLLs used for creating memory dumps. This activity is suspicious as these DLLs are often leveraged by attackers, for example, to dump credentials from processes like LSASS using the MiniDumpWriteDump API. Tools like ProcessHacker and the SilentTrinity C2 Framework are known to use this technique.
Detects processes loading modules related to the PCRE.NET package, specifically looking for a unique temporary path often associated with its deployment. This could indicate the execution of code leveraging this package, potentially for malicious purposes like regular expression-based obfuscation or payload delivery.
This rule detects the loading of 'sdiageng.dll' by 'msdt.exe'. This specific combination is known to be exploited by vulnerabilities such as CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk, which leverage msdt.exe for arbitrary code execution by loading a diagnostic library.
Detects the loading of DLLs associated with the Time Travel Debugging (TTD) utility. Adversaries can leverage TTD, specifically `tttracer.exe`, to execute malicious processes or dump sensitive process memory, such as that of `lsass.exe`, for credential access. This rule focuses on the dynamic loading of TTD-related DLLs, indicating potential use of the utility.
Page 54 of 56