Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a potential DLL hijack involving 'iertutil.dll' when loaded by 'iexplore.exe' within the context of the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class. This could indicate an adversary attempting to execute malicious code by manipulating the DLL search order or substituting a legitimate DLL.
Detects when a Microsoft Office application (Excel, Publisher, Outlook, OneNote, PowerPoint, Word) loads a PowerShell core DLL. This behavior is highly suspicious as Office applications typically do not need to load PowerShell DLLs, and it can indicate an attempt to execute PowerShell code within the context of a trusted Office application, potentially for defense evasion or malicious scripting.
Detects when 'rundll32.exe' attempts to load a DLL from a remote network path (e.g., a UNC path starting with '\\'). This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, as legitimate rundll32.exe usage typically involves loading local DLLs.
Detects when a Microsoft Office application (Excel, Publisher, OneNote, Outlook, PowerPoint, Word) loads specific Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) related DLLs (VBE7.DLL, VBEUI.DLL, VBE7INTL.DLL). This activity can indicate the presence and execution of VBA macros, which are often used by adversaries for initial access or execution.
Detects `rundll32.exe` loading a renamed `comsvcs.dll` to dump process memory, which is a common technique for credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS. The rule looks for `rundll32.exe` executions where the loaded image is NOT the legitimate `comsvcs.dll` (implying a renamed or malicious version).
Detects when the 'outlvba.dll' (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) is loaded by the 'outlook.exe' process. This activity can indicate the use of VBA macros within Outlook, which can be leveraged for persistence or execution by adversaries.
Detects when a legitimate system process, identified by its executable path starting with 'C:\Windows\', loads a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) from a suspicious or permissively permissioned location such as 'C:\Users\Public\' or 'C:\PerfLogs\'. This behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC), achieve persistence, or execute malicious code through DLL side-loading or hijacking techniques.
Detects a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that exploits the 'iscsicpl.exe' process. This bypass leverages DLL Search Order Hijacking to load a malicious 'iscsiexe.dll' from a user-controlled location (e.g., temporary directory or a modified PATH environment variable) instead of the legitimate system directory. The rule specifically looks for 'iscsicpl.exe' loading 'iscsiexe.dll' from any location other than 'C:\Windows\'.
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. This specific rule focuses on `wmiprvse.exe` loading the hijacked `wbemcomn.dll`.
Detects blocked image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects a remote DLL load event via "rundll32.exe".
Detects loaded unsigned image on the system
Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes.
Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process
Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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