Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,161 detections
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Detects the loading of common Windows system DLLs (e.g., version.dll, dbghelp.dll) from suspicious, non-standard directory paths. Such behavior is often indicative of DLL side-loading or hijacking attempts, where an adversary places a malicious DLL with the same name as a legitimate one in a writable directory to influence application execution.
Detects DLL side-loading where a known legitimate signed executable, often associated with security utilities, loads a DLL from a non-standard, user-writable directory (such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData). This behavior is characteristic of APT10's (Stone Panda/Cicada) historical tradecraft in MSP environments to execute modular PlugX RAT payloads.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
This rule detects the suspicious pattern of a process reading a 'pool.db' file followed immediately by the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) modules (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This behavior is characteristic of fileless execution chains where a secondary payload is retrieved and executed directly in memory.
Detects the SectopRAT shellcode execution stage by identifying the concurrent access of a specific encrypted database file (Activation.Desktop.db) and the loading of a malicious DLL (stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll) on the same device within a 5-minute window. This behavior suggests the decryption and execution of shellcode via DLL callback abuse.
Detects the ReportDump.exe process initiating a network connection on port 15847 followed by the loading of GDI/User32 libraries shortly thereafter. This behavior is indicative of SectopRAT establishing a command-and-control channel and initializing screen capture capabilities.
Detects instances where a signed executable loads an unsigned, invalid, or revoked DLL that shares the same base filename, located outside of standard Windows system directories (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS). This behavior is characteristic of DLL search-order hijacking and side-loading attacks often employed by loaders and malware such as Cobalt Strike.
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects anomalous child process execution from SharePoint's w3wp.exe worker process following the loading of suspicious .NET assemblies (PresentationFramework.dll, System.Xaml.dll, System.Data.Services.dll). This behavior is indicative of a post-exploitation stage for SharePoint SafeControls bypass vulnerabilities, where a gadget chain is utilized to execute unmanaged or child processes.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the interaction between Claude Desktop and the CEF (Chromium Embedded Framework) library, which may indicate unauthorized plugin or extension loading; second, the execution of non-standard binaries initiated by various JetBrains IDE processes located outside of standard program directories, which could indicate process hollowing or unauthorized tool execution.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
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