Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects authentication events associated with known actor infrastructure (AnonyMousKIT/Cluster B/UKT) and identifies anomalous crossover patterns where a single source IP authenticates into multiple distinct accounts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a shared backend infrastructure across multiple accounts or storefronts.
Detects anomalous, high-volume authentication failures originating from a single source IP address targeting multiple distinct internal devices within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a password spraying or brute-force attack.
This rule detects successful authentication events for any user within the monitored environment. This serves as a foundational building block for detecting anomalous user behavior, particularly when combined with additional identity provider audit logs such as MFA method usage or registration timestamps to identify potential MFA bypass or persistence via newly registered MFA devices.
This rule detects potential identity compromise via abuse of the OAuth device-code grant flow. It monitors for successful user logins leveraging the device code flow, which is a common indicator of AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns that lure users into authorizing malicious applications under pretexts like security updates or SSO re-authentication.
This rule detects potential identity compromise via abuse of the OAuth device-code grant flow. It monitors for successful user logins leveraging the device code flow, which is a common indicator of AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns that lure users into authorizing malicious applications under pretexts like security updates or SSO re-authentication.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
Detects successful device code authentication flows involving applications that are not part of a known list of standard Microsoft and Azure client applications. Device code flows are frequently abused in phishing attacks to bypass traditional credential-based authentication.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins (ResultType 0) originating from specific Autonomous System Numbers (197540, 216154) where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required or not recorded, and where Conditional Access policies either did not apply or succeeded without enforcing MFA.
Detects sign-in activity using pre-existing durable session tokens (e.g., PRT, broker-based tokens) that occur shortly after a password reset, suggesting that the adversary has maintained persistent access despite the credential change.
This rule detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) or special logon events (Event ID 4648) with specific logon types (7: NetworkCleartext, 8: NewCredentials, 9: Network, 11: CachedInteractive) that occur within 24 hours of a user registration event on the same host. This pattern may indicate suspicious account usage shortly after account creation or registration on a device.
Detects instances where a user grants OAuth application permissions to GitHub or Slack shortly (within 30 minutes) after signing into a low-trust application (Discourse or OpenAI Community), suggesting a potential session hijacking or trusted-relationship abuse scenario where an attacker leverages an existing SSO session to authorize malicious applications.
Detects instances where a user account experiences an 'Unusual sign-in' event followed by the registration of a new MFA or security information method within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistent access by registering their own authentication device to a compromised account.
Detects anomalous SSH authentication patterns characterized by a high volume of failed logon attempts (>= 10) originating from a specific IP address within a short timeframe (30 minutes), followed by a successful authentication to the same target device. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force or password guessing attack against an exposed SSH service.
Detects potential post-authentication persistent actions (e.g., OAuth app grants, MFA changes, mailbox rule updates) performed shortly after a successful Google Workspace login, specifically flagging actions originating from IP addresses different from the login session to identify session hijacking or token replay (AiTM) activity. Includes suppression for known corporate IP ranges, trusted OAuth application consents, and recurring user behavior.
Detects potential post-authentication persistent actions (e.g., OAuth app grants, MFA changes, mailbox rule updates) performed shortly after a successful Google Workspace login, specifically flagging actions originating from IP addresses different from the login session to identify session hijacking or token replay (AiTM) activity. Includes suppression for known corporate IP ranges, trusted OAuth application consents, and recurring user behavior.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized root account activity by monitoring for 'root' logon events and privileged process execution (such as 'su' or 'sudo'). It flags sessions or commands that occur outside of defined business hours, originate from unapproved IP addresses, use unapproved accounts, or are executed via suspicious parent processes, providing a high-confidence indicator of anomalous administrative behavior.
This rule monitors for various types of events (user logons, network connections, API audits, cloud app events, and email traffic) originating from a specific CIDR block (160.79.104.0/21), which is flagged as suspicious or unauthorized.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The registration match is scoped strictly to the Device Registration Service resource (not the broader Microsoft Authentication Broker app, which fires on routine token refresh/broker activity unrelated to registering a new device). The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
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