Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects a successful VPN authentication event followed within 30 minutes by the execution of the MeshAgent RMM tool or its renamed variant mvtcs.exe. This behavioral pattern is associated with initial access via compromised VPN credentials followed by the deployment of remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for persistence and command and control.
Kerberos TGT Request Anomaly Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects potential indicators of forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (Golden Tickets). It monitors Kerberos authentication events (4768 and 4769) for specific anomalies, including ticket requests for non-existent accounts (Status 0x6), suspicious service requests (krbtgt with RC4 encryption), and abnormal ticket option usage, which are common artifacts of credential manipulation and forgery.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior shortly after a successful MFA-authenticated session in Microsoft 365. This rule flags scenarios where a subsequent session for the same user occurs within a short window (30 minutes) from a different IP, ASN, User-Agent, or device identifier, potentially indicating the replay of a stolen session cookie obtained via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing.
Detects high-risk account modifications, such as adding MFA methods or OAuth consent grants, occurring shortly after a user sign-in. This pattern is indicative of post-AiTM session theft (e.g., NovaCookies) where an adversary uses a stolen session token to modify account settings for persistence or MFA bypass.
Detects potential remote service session hijacking by monitoring for RDP session ID reuse by a different user or unauthorized SSH session reattachment (e.g., tmux/screen hijacking). It correlates logon events with process execution to identify instances where an existing session is accessed by an account other than the original owner, while excluding legitimate service/support account activity.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects inbound emails masquerading as reputable advisory firms (PwC or KPMG) using lookalike sender domains, combined with wire-transfer fraud phrases in the subject line. Correlates with identity logon telemetry for the same fraudulent WhatsApp Business phone number, enabling detection across both email and authentication channels. Note: message body content is not available in the EmailEvents schema, so fraud-phrase matching is subject-only.
This rule detects network communication, email interaction, or identity logon events related to known spoofed IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center) domains used in business email compromise (BEC) campaigns. The detection covers multiple telemetry sources including email URL information, device network events, and identity logon logs to identify attempts to interact with fraudulent portals.
Detects lateral movement activity where a host identified as running the Langflow framework attempts to connect to internal MySQL (3306) or Nacos (8848) services while utilizing root credentials, potentially indicating an attacker pivoting from a compromised application server.
Detects lateral movement activity where a host identified as running the Langflow framework attempts to connect to internal MySQL (3306) or Nacos (8848) services while utilizing root credentials, potentially indicating an attacker pivoting from a compromised application server.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
This rule monitors for various types of events (user logons, network connections, API audits, cloud app events, and email traffic) originating from a specific CIDR block (160.79.104.0/21), which is flagged as suspicious or unauthorized.
This rule detects successful user authentication events within the environment. It acts as a base filter to capture login success, which can be further refined with context such as IP addresses or usernames to monitor for anomalous login patterns, though it does not inherently provide detection of complex attacks like session token hijacking on its own.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell, or rundll32) spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe shortly after a remote interactive or network logon on the same device.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized root account activity by monitoring for 'root' logon events and privileged process execution (such as 'su' or 'sudo'). It flags sessions or commands that occur outside of defined business hours, originate from unapproved IP addresses, use unapproved accounts, or are executed via suspicious parent processes, providing a high-confidence indicator of anomalous administrative behavior.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins, such as those using refresh or session tokens, originating from an IP address, ASN, device, or country that does not match the user's recent interactive sign-in history. The absence of an MFA challenge for these new contexts is characteristic of session token replay attacks, often associated with AiTM phishing campaigns.
Detects successful authentication events to the Cisco Secure Firepower Management Center (FMC) web management interface involving low-privileged or read-only user accounts. This pattern is potentially associated with exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-20316, which may be leveraged for privilege escalation or unauthorized access.
Detects successful authentication events to the Cisco Secure Firepower Management Center (FMC) web management interface involving low-privileged or read-only user accounts. This pattern is potentially associated with exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-20316, which may be leveraged for privilege escalation or unauthorized access.
Detects an Azure AD Device Code authentication event followed within 60 seconds by a non-interactive Primary Refresh Token (PRT) sign-in event from the same user. This sequence is characteristic of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where a user is tricked into authorizing a device code, and the adversary immediately leverages the resulting session/token to obtain a PRT for persistent access.
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