Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects successful sign-ins by accounts that appear to be Azure AD Connect synchronization service accounts (e.g., 'MSOL_', 'Sync_', 'AADConnect') but are not initiating from the expected Microsoft Azure Active Directory Connect application. This may indicate an adversary attempting to use these highly privileged service accounts for unauthorized access or lateral movement.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement where a single account uses NTLM authentication as a local administrator to access three or more distinct devices within a 30-minute window, a pattern often indicative of automated credential propagation.
Detects successful user sign-ins from a country that has not been observed in the user's sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This baseline helps identify potentially compromised accounts by surfacing geographic anomalies.
Detects potential Windows privilege escalation attempts where a user account is assigned the SeImpersonatePrivilege and subsequently executes known exploitation tools (e.g., Potato-family exploits) within a short window. This pattern often indicates an attempt to escalate to SYSTEM privileges by abusing token impersonation vulnerabilities.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on network devices by monitoring Syslog messages for account creation with high privileges, privilege abuse, configuration wiping, and anomalous SSH logins from unauthorized source IP addresses. The rule aggregates these events to identify multi-stage exploitation patterns on network infrastructure.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on network devices by monitoring Syslog messages for account creation with high privileges, privilege abuse, configuration wiping, and anomalous SSH logins from unauthorized source IP addresses. The rule aggregates these events to identify multi-stage exploitation patterns on network infrastructure.
This rule monitors for successful external logins occurring on an endpoint that previously demonstrated patterns of suspected MFA fatigue (multiple failed push notifications) and subsequent internal reconnaissance activity (execution of commands used for domain or system discovery). The rule correlates these events to identify potential compromised credentials being actively used for lateral movement or persistence.
This rule identifies a suspicious sequence of events: a successful device code authentication immediately followed (within one hour) by a device registration event (PRT upgrade) for the same user. This pattern is indicative of a device code phishing attack where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a device code, then registers their own device to gain persistent access.
Detects suspicious process executions where 'ctfmon.exe' or 'cloudfiles.exe' are initiated by a non-SYSTEM user but contain 'SYSTEM' in their command line. This could indicate an attempt to impersonate or escalate privileges, potentially by manipulating process arguments or environment variables to execute code as SYSTEM.
Detects suspicious process executions where 'ctfmon.exe' or 'cloudfiles.exe' are initiated by a non-SYSTEM user but contain 'SYSTEM' in their command line. This could indicate an attempt to impersonate or escalate privileges, especially when combined with a successful logon event for the same user.
Detects accounts with first-time RDP logins to multiple systems (3 or more) within a short time window (30 minutes or less). This behavior is indicative of lateral movement, often seen after initial access via stolen VPN credentials, as observed with the Akira ransomware group.
Detects suspicious device access patterns and multiple failed authentication attempts from unmanaged devices and outside the corporate network, combined with Azure AD Identity Protection risk states. This rule identifies potential credential access attempts or account compromise.
Detects local account RDP logins originating from external IP addresses
Detects multiple instances of a non-SYSTEM or non-LOCAL SERVICE account using 'RunAs' to execute processes as highly privileged accounts (admin, system, root) within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attempt at privilege escalation or token impersonation.
This rule detects successful sign-ins using OAuth from residential IP addresses. It joins `SigninLogs` with `IdentityLogonEvents` to correlate successful OAuth authentications with user logon events. The intent is to identify potentially suspicious access, possibly indicating credential abuse or unauthorized access attempts from non-corporate or unexpected locations.
Detects suspicious device access patterns and multiple failed authentication attempts from unmanaged devices and outside the corporate network, combined with Azure AD Identity Protection risk states. This rule identifies potential credential access attempts or account compromise.
Detects suspicious access to network device configuration files or routing table exports, potentially indicating compromise by the Salt Typhoon threat actor. This rule correlates file access events on critical configuration files (e.g., running-config, startup-config, BGP routes) within sensitive directories with network or remote interactive logons by local administrators.
This rule detects repeated failed or successful logon attempts (EventID 4625 or 4624) to sensitive system accounts like 'SYSTEM', 'LOCAL SERVICE', 'NETWORK SERVICE', or 'ADMIN$' from non-system accounts. It specifically looks for interactive (LogonType 10), remote interactive (LogonType 3), or unlock (LogonType 9) logons, and triggers if there are 3 or more such attempts within an hour for the same account and computer.
Detects local account RDP logins originating from external IP addresses
This rule detects repeated failed or successful logon attempts (EventID 4625 or 4624) to sensitive system accounts like 'SYSTEM', 'LOCAL SERVICE', 'NETWORK SERVICE', or 'ADMIN$' from non-system accounts. It specifically looks for interactive (LogonType 10), remote interactive (LogonType 3), or unlock (LogonType 9) logons, and triggers if there are 3 or more such attempts within an hour for the same account and computer.
Detects multiple instances of a non-SYSTEM or non-LOCAL SERVICE account using 'RunAs' to execute processes as highly privileged accounts (admin, system, root) within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attempt at privilege escalation or token impersonation.
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