Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects non-interactive Microsoft Entra ID service principal or managed identity sign-in events originating from an IP address, ASN, or country that has not been historically associated with that specific service principal. This behavior may indicate the use of compromised service principal credentials or stolen access tokens from adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for Azure Service Principals by comparing the current source IP/ASN and country against a 30-day historical baseline. This alert identifies potentially compromised service principals, where attackers exfiltrate secrets or certificates and attempt to authenticate from their own infrastructure.
Detects impossible travel activity for Azure AD accounts by calculating the speed between consecutive sign-in events using the Haversine formula. The rule correlates sign-ins sharing the same SessionId or DeviceId and identifies instances where the calculated travel speed exceeds 900 km/h over a distance greater than 300 km. It includes filtering to exclude known corporate VPN egress points to reduce noise.
Detects impossible travel activity for Azure AD accounts by calculating the speed between consecutive sign-in events using the Haversine formula. The rule correlates sign-ins sharing the same SessionId or DeviceId and identifies instances where the calculated travel speed exceeds 900 km/h over a distance greater than 300 km. It includes filtering to exclude known corporate VPN egress points to reduce noise.
This rule monitors Azure AD and Office 365 non-interactive sign-in logs to identify anomalous spikes in activity from previously unseen applications or devices. It uses a 30-day baseline to determine if a sign-in pair (User/App/Device) is known. It further flags sign-ins from unrecognized locations (ASN/Country), flagging them with higher severity. This behavior is often indicative of automated credential abuse or token exploitation.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful non-interactive authentication event (e.g., token-based sign-in) and a subsequent device registration event performed by the same user identity within a short time window. This sequence is a known pattern for attackers seeking to register an adversary-controlled device against a compromised account to establish durable persistence and potentially bypass conditional access policies (PRT persistence).
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful non-interactive authentication event (e.g., token-based sign-in) and a subsequent device registration event performed by the same user identity within a short time window. This sequence is a known pattern for attackers seeking to register an adversary-controlled device against a compromised account to establish durable persistence and potentially bypass conditional access policies (PRT persistence).
Detects a user account adding a new client secret or certificate to an Azure AD application/service principal, followed by a sign-in event from that same service principal originating from an IP address not observed in the prior 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential persistent access creation by an adversary using newly generated credentials.
Detects instances where a user account performs non-interactive or legacy authentication (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP, ActiveSync) shortly after an endpoint associated with that same user is flagged for malware or infostealer activity. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using exfiltrated credentials to maintain access to cloud services while bypassing MFA policies.
Detects sign-in events to high-privileged cloud management consoles (e.g., Azure Portal, Microsoft Entra, Intune, Okta, AWS, GCP) originating from sessions with elevated risk or anomalous characteristics. The detection monitors for factors such as the use of anonymized IP addresses, unmanaged devices, sessions marked as 'atRisk' by identity providers, or non-interactive service-based access to management APIs that deviate from standard administrative workflow patterns.
Detects anomalous Entra ID sign-in patterns indicating potential session hijacking or stolen session cookie replay. The rule identifies pairs of successful sign-ins where the geographic distance and time elapsed suggest impossible travel, or where the device/browser context changes without a fresh MFA challenge, suggesting the bypass of authentication requirements via persistent session tokens.
Detects potential lateral movement by users who have recently been flagged for credential theft or infostealer activity. The rule correlates initial security alerts with subsequent Windows logon events (RDP, network/WinRM) or SMB share access, identifying users connecting to multiple distinct destinations within a 48-hour window.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where multiple distinct user identities authenticate from the same source IP (often a VPN or proxy) within a short timeframe, characteristic of North Korean IT worker laptop-farm or identity-mule operations where a single operator manages multiple contractor accounts.
This rule detects potentially malicious Microsoft 365 sign-in events characterized by the use of residential proxy network providers commonly associated with session hijacking activities. It specifically flags sessions that were allowed without a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, suggesting the use of an already authenticated stolen session token.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity where a user successfully authenticates to Microsoft 365 with MFA, followed shortly by a session from a different IP address reusing the same session ID without a repeated MFA challenge.
Detects instances where a user account triggers a risky sign-in event (flagged by identity protection) and subsequently uses the same session or token to authenticate successfully from a different network location or IP address within two hours. This behavior suggests that a malicious actor may be leveraging a compromised session token that should have been revoked, potentially indicating a failure of continuous access evaluation or token revocation mechanisms.
This rule detects activities indicative of an attacker attempting to establish an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position within an on-premises network. It flags potential NTLM relay attempts (via loopback or invalid workstation indicators) and unauthorized name resolution spoofing (LLMNR/NBT-NS) used to intercept and relay authentication traffic for MFA bypass or credential theft.
Detects the clearing of Windows Security Event Logs (EventID 1102) within 15 minutes of a successful user logon (EventID 4624) on the same host. This activity is a common anti-forensics technique used by adversaries to hide malicious actions following an authenticated session.
Detects potential lateral movement by identifying NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to administrative network shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or high-frequency access to multiple hosts by the same user, which may indicate credential abuse or lateral movement attempts.
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