Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query will provide a report of many of the best practice configurations for Defender ATP deployment. Special Thanks to Gilad Mittelman for the initial inspiration and concept.
Any tests which are reporting "BAD" as a result imply that the associated capability is not configured per best practice recommendation.
Any tests which are reporting "BAD" as a result imply that the associated capability is not configured per best practice recommendation.
This query will hunt for files matching the current abuse.ch recent threat feed based on Sha256. Currently the query is set up to analyze the last day worth of events, but this is configurable using the MaxAge variable.
C2-NamedPipe
KQL
Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known APT malware.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Graph of MDO detections trended over time
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ryuk ransomware. There is also a related blog.
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
Ryuk operators use PsExec to manually spread the ransomware to other devices.
The following query detects remote file creation events that might indicate an active attack.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
Ryuk operators use PsExec to manually spread the ransomware to other devices.
The following query detects remote file creation events that might indicate an active attack.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
This query helps reviewing URL click count by ClickAction
This query offers daily categorization of ASR rules, helping SOC analysts monitor specific categories like office-related activities or WMI among the 16 rules.
It aids in tracking detection rates and organizational trends.
It aids in tracking detection rates and organizational trends.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ransomware continues to hit healthcare, critical services.
It finds all user accounts that have logged on to an endpoint affected by Cobalt Strike, a penetration tool.
Assume that all credentials on endpoints affected by Cobalt Strike were available to attackers and that all associated accounts are compromised. Note that attackers will not only dump credentials for accounts that have logged on to interactive or RDP sessions, but will also dump cached credentials and passwords for service accounts and scheduled tasks that are stored in the LSA Secrets section of the registry.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154/
It finds all user accounts that have logged on to an endpoint affected by Cobalt Strike, a penetration tool.
Assume that all credentials on endpoints affected by Cobalt Strike were available to attackers and that all associated accounts are compromised. Note that attackers will not only dump credentials for accounts that have logged on to interactive or RDP sessions, but will also dump cached credentials and passwords for service accounts and scheduled tasks that are stored in the LSA Secrets section of the registry.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154/
Query for Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections.
Query #1: Query for Antivirus detection events.
Query #1: Query for Antivirus detection events.
This query visualises total emails with Malware detections summarizing the data by ThreatNames of the malware detected.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Sysrv botnet evolution.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances where the attacker commanded the Kinsing miner file to be downloaded on Linux devices.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances where the attacker commanded the Kinsing miner file to be downloaded on Linux devices.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Cypherpunk ransomware leaves wake of tampered AVs.
Cypherpunk is a human-operated ransomware campaign named after the unusual .cypherpunk extension given to encrypted files.
The query below surfaces commands that follow the distinctive pattern Cypherpunk operators would use to remotely execute code.
Cypherpunk is a human-operated ransomware campaign named after the unusual .cypherpunk extension given to encrypted files.
The query below surfaces commands that follow the distinctive pattern Cypherpunk operators would use to remotely execute code.
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in late summer 2021 using malvertising to download malicious .msi files onto affected machines. This campaign was originally tweeted by @MsftSecIntel on Twitter.
In this campaign, the malicious .msi files create registry keys that use that attacker-created comapny names.
In this campaign, the malicious .msi files create registry keys that use that attacker-created comapny names.
'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Europium actor.
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government '
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government '
This query visualises total emails with Malware detections over time summarizing the data daily by Delivery Location.
'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Hive Ransomware.
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
Identify accounts that have logged on to affected endpoints.
Check for specific alerts.
Check for specific alerts.
This query checks devices for the presence of files that have been sent by a known malicious sender. To use this query, replace the email address with the address of the known malicious sender.
This rule detects when the ASR rule AsrRansomwareBlocked or AsrRansomwareAudited is triggered.
No alert is generated by default. This could be the start of a ransomware attack.
Additional information available by Microsoft:
https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#use-advanced-protection-against-ransomware
No alert is generated by default. This could be the start of a ransomware attack.
Additional information available by Microsoft:
https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#use-advanced-protection-against-ransomware
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
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