Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the NjRAT backdoor, a remote access Trojan (RAT). It identifies two main versions of the malware based on distinct byte patterns related to persistence mechanisms, command and control (connect, send, receive) functionalities, and system information gathering. The rule looks for specific sequences of bytecode instructions indicative of NjRAT's operational logic.
Detects triggering of AMSI by Windows Defender.
This rule detects the ChinaZ trojan by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its functionalities. These functionalities include collecting system information, sending system information, parsing C2 commands, and performing DNS flood attacks. The rule contains distinct byte patterns for both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures of the malware.
Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user uploads files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware.
Detects relevant ClamAV messages
Yara rule that detects ChinaZ trojan.
Yara rule that detects NjRAT backdoor.
This rule detects the AsyncRAT backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to its server communication, data handling, URL opening, and monitoring functionalities. The rule uses two main sets of string conditions, both of which are indicative of AsyncRAT's operational mechanisms. The first set ($read_server_data_v1, $send_v1, and $read_packet_v1_p*) focuses on its core communication and data processing. The second set ($send_v2, $open_url_v2, and $monitoring_v2) targets more advanced features like URL manipulation and system monitoring. The rule also checks for the MZ header (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) to ensure the scanned file is a Windows executable.
This rule detects the Linodas backdoor on Linux systems by identifying specific byte patterns related to its persistence mechanisms for Ubuntu and RedHat distributions, network communication functions, and machine ID generation routines. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns to ensure high fidelity detection of the malware.
This rule detects the Linux_Trojan_AcidRain malware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its destructive capabilities. The rule looks for functions related to destroying files using ioctls, overwriting files, and redundant reboot attempts, indicating the presence of the AcidRain wiper malware.
This rule detects the Menorah backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to its functionality. The patterns indicate capabilities such as sending system fingerprints to a command and control (C2) server, enumerating files and directories, and uploading files to the C2 server. The rule specifically targets .NET bytecode (MSIL) and requires all three sets of patterns to be present for a match, reducing false positives.
Yara rule that detects AsyncRAT backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Linodas backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Menorah backdoor.
Yara rule that detects AcidRain trojan.
This YARA rule detects the Albabat ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. The rule looks for patterns related to file encryption, dropping a ransom note, changing the desktop wallpaper, and finding files to encrypt. The presence of these combined patterns indicates the likely presence of the Albabat ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the SideTwist backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include anti-sandbox detection, collection of host information, communication with a command and control (C2) server, parsing C2 responses, downloading files from the C2, and replying to the C2 server. The rule requires all these distinct patterns to be present within a PE file (identified by the 'MZ' header) to trigger a detection, aiming to minimize false positives.
This rule detects the LimeRAT backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its persistence mechanism, cryptocurrency mining capabilities, downloader functionality, and network communication routines. The rule looks for a combination of these distinct patterns within a file to confirm the presence of LimeRAT.
This rule detects the Linux_Backdoor_Krasue malware. It identifies specific byte patterns within the executable that correspond to functions for switching servers, getting hostname information, starting server processes, sending encrypted data, and notifying the server. The rule also checks for the ELF magic number to ensure it's a Linux executable.
Yara rule that detects SideTwist backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Albabat ransomware.
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