Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Flags MFA method deletions performed by an actor other than the account owner, especially when followed by registration of a new authenticator — the signature of a helpdesk agent socially engineered into swapping a victim's MFA factor.
Sequence detection for the three-step chain — credential reset, MFA/authenticator reset, new device registration — completing within 40 minutes for one user, directly modeling the Scattered Spider/UNC3944 speed-to-domain-admin playbook from Mandiant M-Trends 2026.
Flags Temporary Access Pass issuance to accounts holding privileged directory roles, especially when issued by Tier-1 support rather than a PIM-approved workflow — TAP is the modern equivalent of the helpdesk MFA bypass abused in Scattered Spider-style intrusions.
Detects the reuse of a session or refresh token from a geographic location that contradicts recent user activity (impossible travel) without a new interactive MFA challenge. This activity is indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks, such as those leveraging Evilginx, where session cookies are captured and replayed from attacker infrastructure to bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects successful VPN authentication events where no multi-factor authentication (MFA) method is reported in the logs. This behavior may indicate an account compromise where an adversary has bypassed MFA or is using a legacy account that lacks MFA enforcement.
Detects a suspicious correlation where an employee's phone number undergoes a SIM change or number reassignment event, immediately followed by a successful login using SMS-based MFA for the same identity. This pattern is indicative of SIM swapping/hijacking attacks, often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to bypass SMS-based multi-factor authentication.
Detects successful VPN logins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and originate from unusual ASN/IP addresses or occur during atypical hours. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized access using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor patterns that exploit environments lacking mandatory MFA enforcement.
Detects high-privilege account management actions in Entra ID (password resets or MFA modifications) performed by service or admin accounts, which are characteristic of social engineering (vishing) attacks targeting IT helpdesks to gain unauthorized access.
Detects modifications to Entra ID Conditional Access or Okta authentication policies that introduce MFA exclusions, trusted network bypasses, or authentication-strength downgrades. This activity is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or bypass MFA following a successful initial account compromise.
Detects suspicious account management activities, such as password resets or MFA re-enrollment, performed by an operator on a high-privileged or administrator account outside of typical business hours (06:00-20:00). This behavior is often indicative of help-desk impersonation or credential takeover attempts targeting Identity Provider (IdP) administrative roles.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events indicating account takeover: a password reset, followed by an MFA factor re-enrollment, and concluding with a successful login from a geographically impossible location compared to recent history. This pattern often signifies a help-desk-assisted account compromise or token theft.
Detects instances where an administrative user performs a password or MFA method reset on a target account, followed within 24 hours by a sign-in event from that same target account flagged with a high or medium risk level. This sequence is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks, where an attacker utilizes stolen session tokens and subsequently coerces helpdesk or administrative intervention to reset MFA requirements to maintain unauthorized access.
This rule detects potential account compromise by identifying scenarios where a user's security information (MFA methods) is modified, deleted, or updated, followed shortly after (within 24 hours) by a successful sign-in using a less secure authentication method (SMS, Voice, OATH, or Mobile App notification) instead of a stronger method like FIDO2 or Passkey.
Detects modifications to the Entra ID Authentication Methods policy that involve adding or updating an external authentication method. This activity could indicate that an adversary is attempting to configure a malicious or rogue external MFA provider to facilitate authentication bypass or persistent access to the environment.
Detects sign-in events where an external authentication provider is used to fulfill a multi-factor authentication requirement while simultaneously asserting a 'hardware-key' (hwk) claim. This behavior is indicative of an adversary abusing a rogue or misconfigured external MFA provider to forge authentication claims and bypass security controls.
Detects the modification or creation of Azure AD applications that include specific malicious redirect URIs associated with 'TrustSink' style attacks, which abuse external authentication callback mechanisms to intercept tokens and bypass MFA.
Detects successful VPN logins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and originate from unusual ASN/IP addresses or occur during atypical hours. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized access using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor patterns that exploit environments lacking mandatory MFA enforcement.
Detects successful sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an 'External Authentication Method' that reports specific claim identifiers ('possessionorinherence' or 'hwk'). This pattern is indicative of the TrustSink rogue-EAM (External Authentication Method) technique, where an attacker exploits custom MFA providers to forge MFA success assertions, effectively bypassing legitimate hardware-key requirements.
Detects potential theft and reuse of session or refresh tokens for Microsoft 365 services (Exchange/SharePoint) by identifying multiple authentication events for the same user account from different geographic locations and IP addresses within a short timeframe, specifically when no new MFA challenge was performed.
Detects successful OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant sign-ins using the 'Microsoft Authentication Broker' client. This pattern is commonly used in device-code phishing (GhostCode) to trick users into authorizing a malicious application, often bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements.
Detects the creation of an application registered with a specific Microsoft external authentication provider URI, immediately followed by the configuration of its service principal with reply URLs pointing to external tunneling services like ngrok. This sequence is indicative of an attacker attempting to register a rogue MFA provider to intercept authentication requests.
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