Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects scenarios where a user registers a new WebAuthn/Passkey credential and subsequently performs a sign-in from a different network or device shortly after, preceded by a sign-in from a risky or non-passkey-based method. This pattern is often associated with credential abuse or MFA registration hijacking.
Correlates an MFA method change with the next sign-in occurring from an ASN/country never seen for that user in 30 days, operationalizing TrustSphere's 2026 finding that reset-then-new-location access is the clearest signal separating a hijack from a genuine recovery.
Flags changes to a user's registered SMS/voice MFA phone number followed by a successful high-risk sign-in — the SIM-swap/SMS-interception bypass step documented across the 2024-2026 vishing threat-report taxonomy (CrowdStrike, Mandiant, Pindrop).
This rule detects a potential vishing attack by correlating suspicious IT helpdesk requests (e.g., password or MFA reset without manager approval or verified callback) with subsequent sensitive Entra ID identity changes (e.g., self-service password resets, MFA device registration, or new device registration) occurring for the same user within a short time window. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to social-engineer helpdesk staff to bypass authentication controls and compromise a user account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects successful user sign-ins from geographically distant locations occurring within a timeframe that is physically impossible to traverse (implied speed > 900 km/h). The rule further filters for scenarios where the device used for authentication appears non-compliant or uses an unrecognized method, potentially indicating an attacker utilizing stolen credentials and bypassing MFA.
Detects a sequence of events where a user's MFA configuration is modified (typically via a help-desk impersonation vishing attack) followed closely by a successful sign-in from a new IP address. This pattern is indicative of attackers hijacking sessions or stealing credentials by coercing victims into resetting MFA settings.
Detects Azure sign-in events claiming successful hardware-key or FIDO2 authentication where the authentication issuer is not part of a known-good allow-list. This behavior is indicative of a rogue MFA provider, such as the TrustSink attack, which issues forged tokens claiming MFA requirements were satisfied.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user account modifies security information, registers a new MFA method, or resets a password shortly after a successful sign-in from a country not observed for that user within the previous 30 days. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary adds persistence or MFA bypass methods to a newly compromised account.
Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects instances where an account assigned a help-desk or support role performs an MFA, password, or credential reset on an account tagged as an executive or VIP. This behavior is indicative of social engineering and help-desk impersonation attacks commonly utilized by threat actors to perform rogue MFA takeovers.
Detects MFA or credential reset activities on high-value or privileged accounts that lack a corresponding out-of-band verification signal, such as manager approval or identity proofing, within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attempts where attackers manipulate help-desk procedures to bypass identity protections.
Detects user sign-ins that utilize an 'External Authentication Method' within 3 days of a password reset event. This behavior may indicate an adversary has successfully established persistence using a rogue authentication provider (e.g., via a TrustSink or similar malicious configuration) that survives password remediation and is capable of capturing or intercepting subsequent authentication tokens.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was reportedly satisfied by an External Authentication Method (EAM) claim without evidence of a traditional secondary authentication challenge. This behavior is indicative of a 'TrustSink' technique where a rogue or compromised OIDC provider injects a spoofed assertion of MFA success into the authentication token.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by identifying a pattern where a successful multi-factor authentication sign-in event is quickly followed by another successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, device, or geographic location. This behavior is indicative of session cookie theft and replay, commonly associated with phishing toolkits like Evilginx or NovaCookies.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token replay attacks where a user successfully authenticates with MFA and is followed shortly by a subsequent successful login for the same user from a different IP address or device without a fresh MFA challenge, suggesting the use of a stolen session cookie.
Detects a suspicious authentication pattern involving 3 or more MFA failures within 15 minutes, immediately followed by an MFA success for the same user. This pattern is characteristic of potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, where an attacker intercepts a session or MFA token and relays it through separate infrastructure, while the legitimate user's own MFA attempts fail or time out.
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