Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for network and user interaction with known phishing domains that impersonate Microsoft, Outlook, or Teams services. It aggregates data from DNS queries, device network connections, inbound email URL links, and web URL click events to identify potential phishing attempts using a community-sourced watchlist from phishunt.io.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
This rule monitors for the presence of the PoperBlocker browser extension or network traffic directed to associated domains, which are often used by potentially unwanted programs (PUP) or adware.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
This rule monitors for the presence of the PoperBlocker browser extension or network traffic directed to associated domains, which are often used by potentially unwanted programs (PUP) or adware.
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects the initiation of VPN or ICA sessions on Citrix NetScaler devices where there is no record of a corresponding successful AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) login event from the same source IP address within a one-hour lookback window. This pattern may indicate potential authentication bypass attempts, such as those associated with recent vulnerabilities in NetScaler products.
This Splunk query analyzes web logs to identify and categorize user agents, detecting various types of c2 frameworks. This activity can signify malicious actors attempting to interact with hosts on the network using known default configurations of command and control tools.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
This rule monitors for the presence of the PoperBlocker browser extension or network traffic directed to associated domains, which are often used by potentially unwanted programs (PUP) or adware.
This rule monitors network traffic from CommonSecurityLog data to detect bidirectional communication between NetScaler appliances and known malicious infrastructure associated with the CVE-2026-88772 campaign, which is indicative of command-and-control activity.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
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