Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects usage of ntdsutil.exe with arguments designed to dump the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) and the use of netsh.exe for establishing covert port forwarding. These are known 'Living-off-the-Land' (LotL) techniques observed in campaigns attributed to the threat actor Volt Typhoon.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects outbound network connections to known SectopRAT C2 infrastructure, specifically targeting the hardcoded IP 98.142.252.140 or the non-standard port 15847 often used for encrypted exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall logs and compares the SSL certificate SHA1 fingerprint against a blacklist of certificates associated with malware distribution, command and control (C2) infrastructure, or phishing campaigns. This activity is significant as adversaries often reuse or self-sign certificates across malicious infrastructure, allowing defenders to track and detect encrypted sessions even when domains or IPs change. If confirmed malicious, this may indicate beaconing, malware download, or data exfiltration over TLS/SSL.
The following analytic detects file transfers flagged as malware that occurred over non-standard ports (other than 80 and 443). Adversaries may attempt to bypass protocol-based detection or use alternate ports to blend in with other traffic. This analytic identifies these non-conventional flows and surfaces potential evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious this indicate potential malware delivery or other nefarious activity.
This Splunk query analyzes web logs to identify and categorize user agents, detecting various types of Remote Monitoring and Mangement applications. This activity can signify possible compromised hosts on the network.
Detects network traffic matching the default HTTP check-in pattern of Mythic C2 agents. This rule monitors for POST requests using a specific hardcoded User-Agent string and Content-Type header commonly used in default Mythic agent configurations, indicating a potential active command-and-control session.
This rule correlates phishing emails containing URLs with successful, MFA-satisfied sign-ins from an ASN or network location that has not been associated with the user account within the previous 30 days. This pattern is highly indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt, where a user is phished and their session cookie is intercepted by an attacker.
Detects specific markers in UDP traffic on ports 3478, 5349, and 443 that are associated with the DragonForce malware's TRN1 C2 beaconing protocol. The rules identify session initiation, task polling, task acknowledgment, and result uploading behaviors.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule detects Node.js, NPM, or Yarn processes initiating network connections to common Ethereum JSON-RPC providers such as Infura and Alchemy. This activity, when originating from processes not associated with known development directories (like hardhat, truffle, or web3 projects), may indicate malicious use of build tools for blockchain-based command and control (C2) or unauthorized data exfiltration via RPC endpoints.
This rule monitors network appliance logs (Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos) for patterns associated with known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684), SQL injection, path traversal, and command injection attempts within URL parameters. It also flags high-severity IPS/IDS alerts generated by these devices.
This rule monitors network appliance logs (Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos) for patterns associated with known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684), SQL injection, path traversal, and command injection attempts within URL parameters. It also flags high-severity IPS/IDS alerts generated by these devices.
Detects multiple attempts to connect to administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) from a single source within a 60-second window. This pattern is indicative of automated lateral movement or enumeration attempts using the SMB protocol.
Detects network or system activity associated with the 'p2pwn' backdoor account on Dahua cameras, which is introduced by exploiting the CVE-2024-39943 vulnerability. The rule monitors for the presence of 'p2pwn' and 'p2password' strings across logs, including RPC/login events.
Detects periodic network connection patterns indicative of Cobalt Strike beaconing. The rule identifies low-variance jittered traffic, where the communication interval remains relatively consistent over a defined period, consistent with default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
Detects a network connection handshake indicating the use of Chisel, a fast TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP, specifically identifying potential command-and-control beaconing activity.
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