Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication patterns associated with Scattered Spider threat group, including known C2 domains, IP addresses, and characteristic domain patterns used for phishing and command and control operations.
This rule detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool processes or network connections to domains associated with RMM tools. It leverages an external CSV file containing a list of RMM tool executable names and their associated domains to identify suspicious activity. The rule aims to identify the presence and use of legitimate RMM software, which can be abused by adversaries for remote access and control.
Detects network connections to BTunnels domains initiated by a process on the system.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to Dropbox API endpoints (api.dropboxapi.com or content.dropboxapi.com) originating from any executable that is not the legitimate Dropbox application. This behavior can indicate an adversary using a non-standard or malicious process to exfiltrate data or establish command and control via Dropbox.
The analytic detects the execution of `arp.exe` with the `-a` flag, which is used to list network connections on a compromised system. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `arp.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify active devices, and plan further lateral movement or attacks.
Detects network connections to Devtunnels domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse this feature to establish a reverse shell, persistence, or exfiltrate data from a compromised machine.
Detects network connections to Cloudflared tunnels domains initiated by a process on the system. Attackers can abuse this feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
š Description
Threat actors frequently register lookalike domains to support malicious activities such as phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, and command-and-control (C2) operations. This KQL hunting query is designed to help identify potential phishing and typosquatting domains that may be targeting your organization or its third-party vendors.
š Threat Intelligence Feed
The hunting query utilizes data from the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) API, which provides access to newly registered domains.
API Endpoint:
https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/today?json
Use Cases:
Threat intelligence enrichment
Detection of suspicious or malicious domains
Security log correlation
Returned Data Fields:
Domain name
Registration date
IP address
Type
Additional metadata (if available)
Query by Date (Optional):
Example: https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/2025-07-08?json
šÆ ATT&CK Framework Mapping
Technique: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
ID: T1583.001
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK
Threat actors frequently register lookalike domains to support malicious activities such as phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, and command-and-control (C2) operations. This KQL hunting query is designed to help identify potential phishing and typosquatting domains that may be targeting your organization or its third-party vendors.
š Threat Intelligence Feed
The hunting query utilizes data from the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) API, which provides access to newly registered domains.
API Endpoint:
https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/today?json
Use Cases:
Threat intelligence enrichment
Detection of suspicious or malicious domains
Security log correlation
Returned Data Fields:
Domain name
Registration date
IP address
Type
Additional metadata (if available)
Query by Date (Optional):
Example: https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/2025-07-08?json
šÆ ATT&CK Framework Mapping
Technique: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
ID: T1583.001
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK
Detects when a non-browser process initiates network communication with the Telegram API. This activity is suspicious as it could indicate the use of Telegram for covert command and control (C2) or data exfiltration by malware, bypassing typical browser-based interactions.
This rule detects network connections initiated by any binary to the domains 'mega.co.nz' or 'mega.nz'. Attackers have been observed using file-sharing services like MEGA for uploading and downloading additional payloads, facilitating data exfiltration or staging. This detection aims to identify such suspicious communication patterns.
Ngrok is a legitimate tool that creates secure tunnels to localhost servers through NAT/firewalls, often used by developers.
Additionally, Ngrok tunnels have been used by Iranian APT groups, among others, to support their operations particularly for Command and Control (C2), data exfiltration, and initial access staging.
Additionally, Ngrok tunnels have been used by Iranian APT groups, among others, to support their operations particularly for Command and Control (C2), data exfiltration, and initial access staging.
Detects DEVMAN ransomware, a variant of DragonForce, based on unique strings related to its mutex, deterministic file renaming, and internal functionalities observed in analysis.
Detects components of the KimJongRAT PE variant, including the orchestrator (NetworkService.dll), loader (sys.dll/baby.dll), and stealer (dwm.dll), based on unique strings, PDB paths, and network communication artifacts.
Identifies DNS queries to non-standard ports, often used for DNS tunneling or C2. **Validation**: High - DNS to non-53 ports is rarely legitimate.
Detects the use of encoded or obfuscated IP addresses (hex, octal, etc.) within a URL in conjunction with common download commands. This technique is often used by adversaries to evade simple network-based detections or to obscure their infrastructure.
Catches outgoing network connections to external IPs from command-line tools spawned by browsers, indicating potential command-and-control communication in ClickFix attacks.
Detects highly unusual network connections initiated by notepad.exe. This behavior is suspicious because notepad.exe is a simple text editor not designed for network communication. This technique has been observed in campaigns where threat actors inject shellcode into a suspended notepad.exe process to establish command and control (C2) connections.
Detects network traffic to or from IP addresses known to be associated with the active exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2025-53770.
Catches PowerShell processes with both Base64 decoding and network download capabilities, indicating potential remote payload execution typical of advanced ClickFix attacks.
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