Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a rundll32 that communicates with public IP addresses
Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
Detects a "winlogon.exe" process that initiate network communications with public IP addresses
Detects a network connection initiated by IMEWDBLD.EXE. This might indicate potential abuse of the utility as a LOLBIN in order to download arbitrary files or additional payloads.
Detects an office suit application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) communicating to target systems over uncommon ports.
Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to proxy execute code and making network connections.
One could easily make the DLL spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass this rule.
One could easily make the DLL spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass this rule.
Detects "RegAsm.exe" initiating a network connection to public IP adresses
Detects network connections from the Equation Editor process "eqnedt32.exe".
Detects suspicious network connections made by a well-known Windows binary run with no command line parameters
Detects a script interpreter (Wscript/Cscript) initiating a local network connection to download or execute a script hosted on a shared folder.
Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe".
This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn't usually initiate network activity.
This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn't usually initiate network activity.
Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
Detects potential beaconing activity to domains related to 3CX 3CXDesktopApp compromise
Detects network connections from "dfsvc.exe" used to handled ClickOnce applications to non-local IPs
Detects a network connection that was initiated from a PowerShell process.
Often times malicious powershell scripts download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs.
Use this rule as a basis for hunting for anomalies.
Often times malicious powershell scripts download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs.
Use this rule as a basis for hunting for anomalies.
Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443.
Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages.
Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages.
Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
Detects Dllhost.EXE initiating a network connection to a non-local IP address.
Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL.
An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.
Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL.
An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
This query can be used to detect instances of malicious users who attempt to create steganographic images and then immediately browse to a webmail URL. This query would require additional investigation to determine whether the co-occurrance of generating a steganographic image and browsing to a webmail URL is an indication of a malicious event.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, ShadowHammer supply chain attack
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
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