Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects outbound HTTPS connections to major generative AI inference endpoints originating from non-browser, non-development tool processes at regular intervals. This activity is indicative of beaconing behavior, where malware (specifically families like LAMEHUG) leverages LLM APIs for dynamic command generation, payload obfuscation, or C2 instruction retrieval, bypassing traditional security controls.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header indicates a PowerShell execution occurring from a system configured with the zh-CN locale. This pattern is often associated with automated scripts or potential malicious activity masquerading as legitimate PowerShell traffic.
This rule performs a point-in-time IOC hunt within CommonSecurityLog data to detect indicators associated with NeedyMantis. It monitors for specific C2 infrastructure domains ('tripswithengine.com') and a hardcoded user-agent string ('Firefox/21.0') in proxy, firewall, or network logs, which are characteristic of this threat actor's activity.
Detects HTTP(S) requests to known SideCopy/ReverseRAT payload-delivery URLs identified in Operation SideCopy spear-phishing campaigns targeting Indian academia.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects network connections, process command line arguments, and DNS queries associated with identified Galago or Panzer ransomware C2, leak site, or contact infrastructure (Tox IDs/Tor .onion addresses).
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects the installation and execution of Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared.exe) as a Windows service. Adversaries may abuse this utility to create unauthorized persistent network tunnels, enabling covert remote access to the internal network. This rule correlates process creation events involving 'service install' or 'tunnel run' commands with Windows service installation events referencing the cloudflared binary.
Detects repetitive network traffic to the Slack API endpoint '/api/conversations.history' using the 'Go-http-client' User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of the Graphalgo RAT polling Slack for command-and-control (C2) instructions.
Detects network communication from 'rnpkeys.exe' to external IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of the Sauron Loader malware, which utilizes a side-loaded 'rnpkeys.exe' binary to establish beaconing and C2 communication as part of its registration process.
Detects instances where the rnpkeys.exe process initiates a network connection shortly after its execution. The RNP (OpenPGP) utility is generally used for local cryptographic operations; unexpected network activity from this process may indicate potential misuse, data exfiltration, or malicious use of the tool for command-and-control communication.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
Detects a network request to download a file named 'msgbox.exe' using the curl command-line utility, consistent with the activity observed from threat actor UTA0560 (GRIMWEDGE). This rule monitors for HTTP GET requests targeting the specific file path while the User-Agent string begins with 'curl/'.
Detects network indicators associated with the BambooToken C2 infrastructure, including DNS lookups for specific domains, TLS SNI mismatches, non-standard MQTT port usage, and specific command-and-control tasking keywords within MQTT payloads.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects network communication associated with the Cyclops Blink modular malware, specifically targeting known Sandworm C2 IP addresses and non-standard ports used for firewall rule manipulation and C2 beaconing. The rule identifies both inbound and outbound traffic, including potential TLS handshakes on specific non-standard ports.
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