Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects network communication associated with the Cyclops Blink modular malware, specifically targeting known Sandworm C2 IP addresses and non-standard ports used for firewall rule manipulation and C2 beaconing. The rule identifies both inbound and outbound traffic, including potential TLS handshakes on specific non-standard ports.
Detects network traffic associated with the RatHat Android RAT, specifically monitoring for HTTP and TLS connections to the command and control (C2) delivery domain 'kingbss.com', as well as detecting characteristic FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) client login handshake patterns used for tunnel establishment.
This rule detects potential NTLM relay or authentication downgrade attempts by monitoring HTTP POST requests to the Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) endpoint. It specifically flags when an 'Authorization' header contains an NTLM-wrapped 'Negotiate' token, which is often indicative of an attacker attempting to coerce or relay authentication material to the service.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
This rule detects network traffic containing the specific 'Xwormmm' string in the payload, which serves as a handshake or banner characteristic of XWorm command-and-control (C2) communications.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
Detects a two-stage pattern indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication. The rule identifies an initial request to a 'relays.json' endpoint (relay discovery) followed by a request to an 'api.php' endpoint (dispatcher decision) within a 5-second window, both using a 13-digit timestamp query string for cache-busting. It also captures single-stage 'api.php' requests as lower confidence alerts.
Detects HTTP(S) requests to known SideCopy/ReverseRAT payload-delivery URLs identified in Operation SideCopy spear-phishing campaigns targeting Indian academia.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
Detects the Sauron Loader execution chain, which involves a specific process (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, or tdwp.dll) performing a network request (beacon), followed by the creation of a new file (executable, script, or library), and the subsequent execution of that same file. This pattern is characteristic of operator-issued download-and-run tasking.
This rule detects activities indicative of an attacker attempting to establish an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position within an on-premises network. It flags potential NTLM relay attempts (via loopback or invalid workstation indicators) and unauthorized name resolution spoofing (LLMNR/NBT-NS) used to intercept and relay authentication traffic for MFA bypass or credential theft.
This rule detects network requests directed at raw.githubusercontent.com that attempt to retrieve 'init.dat' or files named with a specific GUID format, patterns which are characteristic of the Kimsuky threat group using GitHub as a dead drop resolver for C2 infrastructure discovery.
Detects suspicious activity associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon communication, specifically monitoring for known default named pipes and specific user-agent strings commonly used by Cobalt Strike in HTTP/S traffic.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to OpenAI or Anthropic API endpoints originating from non-browser user agents (e.g., Python requests, curl, Go-http-client). This activity may indicate automated interactions, potentially for malicious purposes such as script-based interaction with LLMs or unauthorized API usage.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or modify Discord's local storage leveldb files, which store user authentication tokens, and correlates this with suspicious network activity to Discord's API or the presence of token-stealing keywords in command-line arguments.
Detects network traffic associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits that impersonate Microsoft and Google login pages. The rules identify the presence of specific HTML elements (like Cloudflare Turnstile anti-bot gates) and authentication session cookie headers served from non-authorized/non-official domains, indicating a reverse-proxy phishing attack.
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