Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,155 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,301
1,070
640
289
288
Contributors
918
814
769
696
224
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
Platforms
2,858
2,017
816
524
213
Products / Services
1,336
1,144
831
576
366
MITRE Techniques
1,822
1,307
787
747
577
CVEs
9
7
7
6
6
IDS Classtypes
538
151
101
57
48
IDS Protocols
375
373
132
64
42
This rule monitors for network communication with known malicious infrastructure (IPs/domains) and the execution of specific suspicious file names. It correlates device network events, file system activity, and process execution, specifically flagging attempts to execute MSI installers or other binaries associated with the identified threat indicators.
Detects network connection events associated with the download of machine learning model artifacts from public hubs that display indicators of malicious intent, such as unverified or newly created publisher accounts, missing or invalid cryptographic signatures, or the presence of embedded executable/pickle-deserialization payloads.
Detects network connection events associated with the download of machine learning model artifacts from public hubs that display indicators of malicious intent, such as unverified or newly created publisher accounts, missing or invalid cryptographic signatures, or the presence of embedded executable/pickle-deserialization payloads.
Detects the abuse of the DFS Namespace Management (DFSNM) interface by monitoring calls to NetrDfsAddStdRoot (opnum 12) and NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot (opnum 13). An adversary can trigger these functions to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an attacker-controlled remote host using NTLM, facilitating NTLM relay attacks.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern against publicly exposed AI service endpoints. The detection correlates: (1) Enumeration of sensitive AI/MCP-related API endpoints (minimum 3 distinct hits) in a 10-minute window; (2) Subsequent POST requests to AI service endpoints within 15 minutes of the enumeration; and (3) A spike of 5 or more server errors (HTTP 5xx) within 10 minutes following the POST activity. This pattern suggests automated reconnaissance followed by attempted exploitation of exposed AI model interfaces or orchestration services. Covers T1595.002, T1190
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects outbound network connections to domains, URLs, and IP:Port combinations identified as malicious in the ThreatFox OSINT feed. This rule covers various commodity malware C2 and payload delivery infrastructure.
Detects network traffic associated with the Exvicy malware delivery chain. The rule identifies two behaviors: first, HTTP GET requests to a '/embed/' endpoint with specific 'embed=1' and 'host=cloudflare-check.net' parameters, and second, established TCP connections to a known command and control (C2) IP address related to the ClickFix social engineering delivery method.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with the Telepuz modular loader. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns, request body parameters, and suspicious User-Agent strings indicative of PowerShell or MSHTA command-and-control communication.
Sweeps Defender Advanced Hunting telemetry for known Sauron Loader indicators: 5 malicious SHA256 hashes (MSI installer, rnp.dll loader, tdwp.dll decrypter, embedded RSA private/public key blobs) across file/process/image-load events, plus 4 C2 domains and their full URLs across network and DNS telemetry. No IP indicators were published in the source reporting (C2 is domain-based over HTTPS) — the IP bucket is intentionally omitted rather than filled with placeholder data.
Detects HTTP traffic related to the Macfinger/ClickFix campaign, where malicious injected scripts or dns-prefetch entries point to known attacker-controlled infrastructure (velvet-otter-glagceis.life) or assets utilized for social engineering and malicious copy-paste exploitation.
This rule detects malicious shell execution patterns associated with ClickFix-based social engineering campaigns, such as the Macfinger AMOS campaign. It monitors for the execution of common shell utilities (curl, wget, bash, sh) with suspicious command-line parameters ('force=1') interacting with known malicious IP addresses (45.150.33.128), as well as the execution of specific malicious files or network callbacks identified in these campaigns.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity related to the AMOS (Atomic macOS) information stealer. It identifies a specific sequence of network requests where an initial registration beacon (POST /api/t) is followed by a shell agent request (GET /api/shell/agent) within 120 seconds, originating from the same destination IP and port.
This rule monitors for network connections and process activities associated with known malicious indicators, including file hashes, C2 IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs. It maps these activities to identify potential command and control communication or other malicious network activity occurring on endpoints.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
Page 30 of 246