Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-35616 on edge/SOHO devices, followed within 5 minutes by the download of an architecture-specific MIPS dropper via curl or wget, a behavior consistent with known threat activity such as the Volt Typhoon/JDY Botnet.
Detects bulk file downloads of executable or script content from web proxies using automated or headless client agents (e.g., curl, wget) where no browser-like Referer is present. The rule aggregates these downloads within a 10-minute window and correlates them with endpoint Sysmon file creation events in non-standard directories, indicating potential tool staging or malware delivery.
This rule detects suspicious network connections made by processes (excluding legitimate EDR processes like mssense.exe and senseir.exe) to URLs commonly associated with EDR command and control (C2) infrastructure. This could indicate an attempt by an adversary to communicate with or manipulate the EDR agent.
Detects malicious browser extensions associated with the StegoAd campaign fetching steganographic payloads (WebP/PNG) from known C2 infrastructure. The detection identifies requests originating from a browser extension context (via Referer header) that target specific image files commonly used by the malware for post-compromise staging and execution guardrail fingerprinting.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
This rule detects outgoing TCP traffic that initiates a SOCKS5 handshake (indicated by the byte sequence |05 01 00|) on destination ports other than standard web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443). This behavior is characteristic of TOR client traffic attempting to establish an anonymous connection to an external TOR relay or node via non-standard network ports.
Detects high-frequency ICMP Echo Requests (Type 8) directed from internal networks to external destinations with oversized payloads (greater than 200 bytes). This pattern is indicative of ICMP tunneling, which is often used by adversaries for covert command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, bypassing standard filtering or monitoring.
Detects outbound FTP STOR (Store) commands directed to external networks. This indicates that a host inside the local network is attempting to upload data to an external server. The rule uses a threshold to filter out isolated commands, triggering when 3 or more STOR commands are detected within 120 seconds, which is characteristic of data exfiltration or staging behavior.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to external networks that match a known Emotet C2 traffic pattern. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests using an 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Content-Type and a URI structure consisting of randomized alphanumeric segments (4-20 characters long). This structure is characteristic of Emotet's communication with its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity indicative of Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 communication. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/updates', '/pixel', '/submit.php') in combination with a default User-Agent string commonly used by Cobalt Strike malleable profiles.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on high ports where the TLS SNI header consists of a 8-20 character random alphanumeric string. This pattern is indicative of default configurations for Metasploit Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS payloads attempting to establish a Command and Control connection.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity to a /submit.php URI with a default Cobalt Strike User-Agent string. This is indicative of a default or poorly customized Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile being used for command and control communication.
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot command-and-control check-ins. The rule looks for an 'established' flow to an external network using a POST method, with a request body containing 'qbot' followed by a version string pattern, which is indicative of the malware reporting system info to its C2 server.
Detects network connections resolving to specific domains or UUID-based API endpoints used by Lorem Ipsum's primary C2 cluster following the late-May ClickFix pivot. This rule identifies known command and control (C2) infrastructure by matching specific domain names and a UUID-based API endpoint pattern in network connection URLs.
Detects suspected malicious activity associated with the Dropping Elephant threat group. The rule monitors for two behaviors: 1) IP address geolocation fingerprinting by identifying non-browser processes communicating with ipify.org and ip2c.org within a 60-second window, and 2) Direct network connections to known Dropping Elephant C2 domains, specifically gcl-power.org and chinagreenenergy.org.
Detects outbound network traffic established by a client using the default self-signed TLS certificate generated by Metasploit for Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS sessions. The rule looks for the common default subject fields 'CN=metasploit' and 'O=msf' within the TLS handshake.
Detects network activity initiated by PowerShell or PWSH processes connecting to a known GIFTEDCROOK C2 IP address or utilizing high non-standard ports (>=8000) for outbound communication. This rule monitors for potential beaconing or command and control activity originating from non-Microsoft signed processes in public network ranges.
Detects command and control (C2) activity attributed to threat actor UAC-0226 by monitoring for direct network connections to known hardcoded C2 IP addresses from suspicious process paths or PowerShell, and by identifying beaconing patterns (regular HTTPS intervals) originating from non-browser processes in sensitive locations like ProgramData or AppData/Local/Temp.
This rule detects a sequence of behaviors indicative of credential theft followed by data staging and exfiltration. It identifies processes accessing sensitive browser credentials or KeePass database files, followed by the creation of a ZIP archive within user profile directories, and concludes with an outbound HTTPS connection to a non-trusted, non-Microsoft external destination by the same process.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints to known infrastructure associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for successful connections or attempts to specific domains (glitch.me, onrender.com, theworkpc.com) or connections containing WebSocket-related headers in the metadata, which indicate C2 activity.
Detects processes that install a low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) and are simultaneously involved in suspicious activity, such as network connections to non-private IP addresses and file writes to typical temporary directories (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp, C:\Users\Public). This behavior is characteristic of keylogging activity and subsequent data exfiltration or staging.
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