Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

5,876 detections

Detects network connections to the Telegram API (api.telegram.org) from processes identified as LOLBins or residing in suspicious, potentially writable locations such as Temp, AppData, or user-defined directories. This activity is often indicative of C2 communication or data exfiltration by malware bypassing standard messaging client restrictions.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious outbound network connections to common Generative AI service APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral) originating from command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or python.exe instances running from temporary directories, which could indicate data exfiltration or the use of AI tools for malicious automation.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects instances where a non-standard browser process accesses sensitive browser credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) and simultaneously establishes a network connection to Discord or transmits data to a Discord webhook. This pattern is consistent with infostealer malware attempting to exfiltrate cached credentials via external services.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects outbound network connections to common webhook and temporary storage services (e.g., discord.com webhooks, webhook.site, pipedream.net) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers. Such behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration, command-and-control (C2) communication, or malicious script activity using these services to bypass traditional network defenses.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
104
This rule monitors for suspicious Linux kernel operations, including the loading of BPF programs via bpftool or system calls, and attempts by debugging or tracing tools to interact with processes using forceful termination signals. It also includes an anomaly detection branch that identifies processes with active network connections that are missing from the system process list, which may indicate process ghosting or hiding techniques.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the unauthorized exfiltration of SSL private key files using Netcat to a known malicious C2 IP address (62.171.185.97). The rule monitors process execution commands that include specific file names associated with certificate harvesting or extraction tools being piped or transmitted over the network.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
This rule detects scenarios where Microsoft Teams initiates a potential screen-sharing session (via outbound network connections on specific ports) followed shortly by the access of VPN configuration files on the same host. This sequence may indicate an attacker using screen-sharing to view credentials or configuration details and subsequently attempting to utilize a VPN client.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the installation, service creation, registry modification, and network activity associated with the Tailscale VPN tool. This rule monitors for persistent use of Tailscale, which can be utilized by threat actors to establish encrypted mesh access to internal environments.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects npm package installation activity or network communication originating from npm-related processes that involve identified malicious packages, maintainers, or scopes associated with supply chain attacks. Specifically monitors for the '@withgoogle' scope squatting, as well as specific malicious package names and maintainer accounts, and tracks related outbound network connections to suspicious C2 domains.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects malicious activity associated with npm supply chain compromise, including execution of known malicious npm lifecycle scripts, DNS queries to suspected C2 domains, and unauthorized access to sensitive developer credential files (such as .npmrc, .aws/credentials, and SSH keys) by Node.js processes.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects execution of the Tailscale or Tailscaled process that is not initiated by standard system or management processes. This may indicate unauthorized installation or use of the Tailscale VPN software for covert command and control or lateral movement, especially when combined with immediate network activity to Tailscale infrastructure or ports.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the presence and activity of Tailscale VPN, including process execution, command-line arguments, network connections to Tailscale infrastructure, and communications within the Tailscale CGNAT address range (100.64.0.0/10). This rule identifies the potential use of Tailscale for tunneling or remote access, which may be unauthorized in some environments.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects modifications to the 'SSLKEYLOGFILE' environment variable in the Windows Registry. This variable is often used by applications like web browsers to log SSL/TLS session keys to a file, which can then be used to decrypt encrypted network traffic. Malicious actors might enable this to capture sensitive data.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
This rule detects suspicious network connections made by processes (excluding legitimate EDR processes like mssense.exe and senseir.exe) to URLs commonly associated with EDR command and control (C2) infrastructure. This could indicate an attempt by an adversary to communicate with or manipulate the EDR agent.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
101
Detects instances where rundll32.exe executes with missing or minimal DLL arguments and subsequently establishes outbound network connections. This behavior is uncommon in legitimate Windows operations and has been observed during ACR Stealer infections, including executions originating from remote SMB shares and memory-loaded payloads.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
201
Detects outbound internet communications generated by rundll32.exe, which is uncommon and frequently associated with malware execution, including ACR Stealer.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
This rule monitors network connections initiated by a process named 'setup.exe' to known malicious or suspicious IP addresses. Legitimate installers should not be initiating network connections to these specific external addresses.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule monitors and alerts on network connections established from endpoints to a predefined list of known malicious IP addresses, which may indicate command-and-control (C2) communication or unauthorized exfiltration attempts.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the SPECTRALVIPER C2 framework. This rule identifies outbound HTTP GET requests targeting known C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses, while correlating the traffic with specific browser user agents and cookie patterns indicative of this actor.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
101
Detects network connection events initiated by the OneDrive sync process (OneDrive.Sync.Services.exe) to known malicious domains or suspicious specific file paths, which may indicate unauthorized use of the OneDrive process for command-and-control communication or malicious file retrieval.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Page 200 of 280