Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific URL pattern consisting of two segments of 4-16 alphanumeric characters, typically observed in Emotet C2 traffic. The rule specifically matches requests with a Content-Type header set to application/octet-stream, which is indicative of malicious binary payload transfer or communication.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to external destinations consistent with default Cobalt Strike HTTP Beacon communication patterns. It specifically looks for GET requests containing URI paths commonly associated with default Cobalt Strike profiles (ca, submit.php, updates.rss) combined with a specific, hardcoded User-Agent string associated with Cobalt Strike's default configuration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a data transfer of 5MB or greater. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized data exfiltration over the web protocol.
Detects the transmission of a Metasploit Meterpreter stage over HTTP, identified by an application/octet-stream response containing the DOS MZ header signature.
Detects network traffic consistent with the default Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 jQuery profile. The rule monitors for GET requests to the URI '/jquery-3.3.1.min.js' accompanied by a specific 'Accept' HTTP header, which is a known indicator of default Cobalt Strike beacon activity.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity related to the Qakbot malware. It specifically monitors for established outbound TLS traffic over non-standard ports (ports other than 443) where the Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains a numeric IPv4 address instead of a domain name, which is a characteristic behavior of Qakbot C2 infrastructure.
Detects outbound network connections from endpoint processes to domains associated with a malicious browser extension. The extension is known to fetch scriptlets that enable main-world JavaScript injection and potential credential theft (e.g., document.cookie).
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from internal network hosts to external destinations that match known Emotet C2 communication patterns, specifically those using hardcoded URI paths such as '/wp-content/', '/wp-admin/', or '/tmp/' combined with the 'Accept-Encoding: identity' header.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a transfer size exceeding 10MB to external (non-HOME_NET) addresses. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration via HTTP.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot malware command and control (C2) activity. The rule identifies a specific combination of a hardcoded User-Agent string ('Trident/7.0') and a URI pattern consisting of 4 to 32 alphanumeric characters ending in .php.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
Detects repeated use of the FTP 'STOR' command to transmit data to an external host within a short timeframe. The STOR command is used in the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to upload a file to the server. An unusual frequency of this command toward external destinations may indicate data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
Detects encrypted WebSocket sessions over non-standard ports or TLS traffic patterns indicative of Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) session token exfiltration to unauthorized command and control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests to external networks containing 'gtag=' in the URI, which is a known technique used by the TrickBot malware to exfiltrate its group identifier during C2 communication.
This rule monitors for FTP 'STOR' commands followed by large data transfers (exceeding 64KB) initiated from internal hosts to external destinations. This pattern is often indicative of data exfiltration using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
Detects endpoint devices navigating through a sequence of two or more distinct cloud-native redirector platforms (specifically Azure Websites, Cloudflare Pages, and AWS S3 buckets) within a 5-minute window, followed by a connection to a non-cloud final destination. This behavior is highly characteristic of adversaries utilizing Traffic Direction Systems (TDS) or Bulletproof Redirect Engines to obfuscate malicious payloads and evade network security controls.
This rule identifies phishing emails containing multiple distinct redirect hops across various cloud hosting platforms (e.g., Azure Websites, Firebase, CloudFront). It flags emails as suspicious if they contain URLs from multiple monitored cloud platforms, indicating a likely bulletproof redirect chain, and correlates these emails with click data. It elevates the severity for emails sent to privileged user accounts such as admins, executives, or finance staff.
Detects processes that load .NET runtime assemblies (clr.dll/coreclr.dll) from non-standard paths while concurrently performing named pipe inter-process communication and initiating outbound network connections. This behavior is often indicative of fileless execution, living-off-the-land techniques, or lateral movement where a process is repurposed as a proxy or command-and-control conduit.
Detects network traffic consistent with the default Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 jQuery profile. The rule monitors for GET requests to the URI '/jquery-3.3.1.min.js' accompanied by a specific 'Accept' HTTP header, which is a known indicator of default Cobalt Strike beacon activity.
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